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Abstract
We develop a general equilibrium model of multiproduct rms with quality dif-
ferentiated goods. Households are characterized by an heterogeneous taste for the
di¤erentiated good and their income level. The use of non-homothetic preferences
and vertical product di¤erentiation (product quality) enables us to analyze how dis-
tributional changes in income a¤ect the number of vertically di¤erentiated rms, their
product range and prices in the presence of strategic interaction across rms. The
implications of lowering the barriers to trade within this setting are considered as
well.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we complement the growing literature of multi-product rms in interna-
tional trade by introducing non-homothetic preferences and vertical product di¤erentiation
(product quality) in a general equilibrium framework. This allows us to analyze how in-
come distribution a¤ects the number of vertically di¤erentiated rms, their product range
and prices. The study of such income distributional e¤ects has been neglected in the lit-
erature of multi-product rms due to the reliance on the assumption that preferences are
(quasi)-homothetic.1 Our paper therefore provides an important contribution that will help
understand changes in the industrial structure within an international environment.
There is ample empirical evidence that shows that the income elasticity of demand
varies across vertically di¤erentiated products a feature inherently ignored under homo-
thetic preferences. Broda and Romalis (2009), for example, show that poorer households
consume disproportionately more goods of low quality. Moreover, there is a growing body
of empirical research in international trade that documents systematic patterns of vertical
specialization.2 Not only do richer countries export disproportionately more goods of high
quality, they also import disproportionately more high quality goods (Hallak, 2006 and
Khandelwal, 2010). Moreover, price variations within the same product categories between
rich and poor countries reveal that richer countries command higher unit values for their
exports in comparison to exports of poor countries (Schott, 2004 and Hallak and Schott,
2011), suggesting that the quality of exports is correlated with the per capita income of
the home country.
In the demand framework considered in this paper, households consume two goods: a
homogeneous and a vertically di¤erentiated good (see also Fajgelbaum et al., 2011). The
decision process of a household to buy one unit of the di¤erentiated good among a set of
mutually exclusive alternatives is modeled using the theory of discrete choice based on a
random utility formulation (McFadden, 1978 and Ben-Akiva et al., 1993). Specically, the
process of buying a specic brand is modeled as a sequence of nested-logit models with the
quality choice at the rst stage and the choice of rm and particular brand from that rm
at subsequent stages;3 multi-product rms are assumed to o¤er more than one product of
1Early work on multi-product rms can be mostly found in the industrial organization literature, for
example, Brander and Eaton (1984), Anderson et al. (1992), Johnson and Myatt (2003), and Allanson and
Montagna (2005).
2Earlier studies include Hunter and Markusen, (1987), Hunter (1991) and more recently Fieler (2011).
3Similar ideas were used by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Goldberg (1995) and Verboven (1996)
to estimate the demand in various car markets.
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the same quality level.4 The multinomial logit structure allows for di¤erences in the degree
of substitutability across goods with consumers considering varieties from a particular rm
as closer substitutes than varieties with the same quality from other rms.5
We assume an oligopolistic market structure (see also Eckel and Neary, 2010 and An-
derson and De Palma, 1992) where rms have to choose both the price and range of brands.
We allow for free entry and exit into the di¤erentiated goods market. The implied strategic
interaction across rms within the same quality sector ensures that the equilibrium number
of rms, the number of products per rm, and the price of a variety is responsive to changes
in the income distribution. In the absence of strategic interaction (monopolistic competi-
tion), any changes in the environment are exclusively linked to changes in the number of
rms (Schafgans and Stibora, 2012). We complement the strategic inter-rm competition
with strategic intra-rm competition also known as the cannibalization e¤ect one of the
most dening feature of multi-product rms, where rms coordinate their pricing decision
across its product range.6
The coexistence of multi-product rms that internalize demand linkages in the presence
of non-homothetic preferences permit a fruitful discussion of changes in industrial structure
to income changes and size of the economy. Specically, we show that in autarky an
increase in income (rst order stochastic dominance) and a mean preserving spread lead
to a larger number of high-quality rms, each producing a larger number of products at
a smaller scale with lower prices in the long-run equilibrium. The opposite occurs in the
low-quality sector and the di¤erentiated goods composition therefore clearly shifts towards
high-quality brands. When the number of low-quality rms exceeds that of high-quality
rms, an increase in the size of the economy is more likely to be accompanied by a shift
in its composition to the high-quality rms the more dissimilar consumers perceive the
brands and rms of high and low-quality goods to be. In the open economy setting, under
complete specialization in quality, lower trade costs for a particular di¤erentiated good
unambiguously increases the number of rms and brands of that di¤erentiated product
with the rm expansion e¤ect dominating the product line expansion when the initial
number of rms is su¢ ciently large. In the case where both countries produce the same
4In Schafgans and Stibora (2013) we develop a model that considers the alternative strategy in which
rms produce multiple products of di¤erent quality.
5Dhingra (2013) also allows for di¤erences in the degree of substitutability using a variation of the linear
quadratic utility function. In a multi-product model, Bernard et al. (2011) use CES preferences for this
purpose.
6Cannibalization is also present in Eckel and Neary (2010) and Dhingra (2013), arising respectively
from strategic inter-rm interaction in a oligopolistic market and strategic intra rm competition in a
monopolistic competitive market.
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di¤erentiated product, our analysis is much more complex (and consequently yields more
ambiguous ndings) in part due to the so called relative price e¤ect. It measures the impact
arising from a change in relative prices of domestic and foreign competitors as a result of the
relative change of the number of brands in both countries. Despite its analytical intricacies,
these results are of empirical relevance.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop the
framework in autarky. In Section 3 we discuss the properties of the short and long-run
autarky equilibrium and provide conditions for a unique and stable long run equilibrium
in which rms produce multiple varieties in low and high quality goods markets. We also
discuss the welfare implications of a change in the population and the income distribution.
In Section 4 we extend the model by considering an open economy with two countries
that, in the presence of trading cost, may engage in trade in the di¤erentiated products.
Section 5 concludes. Technical details are provided in Appendix A (autarky) and B (open
economy).
2 Model
Let us analyze a general equilibrium model of multi-product rms with vertically di¤eren-
tiated goods and households that di¤er in income and taste in a closed economy setting.
Individuals consume two goods: a homogeneous good (z) and an optimally selected
good from a nite set of mutually exclusive di¤erentiated goods. We let the di¤erentiated
goods sector consist of two di¤erent qualities: a high-quality, qH , and a low-quality, qL
where qH > qL. In each quality there are ni > 1 rms each producing mi  1 varieties, for
i = H;L.
Labor is the only factor of production and is inelastically supplied in a competitive
market. The homogeneous good is produced with one unit of e¤ective labor per unit
of output which is also supplied in a perfectly competitive market. The unit price of
the homogeneous good therefore equals the wage rate and we use the wage rate as the
numeraire.
On the demand side, we assume there is a continuum of households each endowed with
a di¤erent skill level generating a non-degenerate income distribution. Each household
is assumed to have su¢ cient income to purchase the homogeneous good and at least the
lowest quality of the di¤erentiated good. We denote the income distribution by Fy(y); so
that Fy(y) is the fraction of the N households with income less than or equal to y and
N
R1
ymin
ydFy (y) the total supply of labor. We next consider how a consumer selects one
unit of a variety of quality qi, for i = H;L; from the total set of varieties in order to
3
maximize utility, given prices and characteristics of all available commodities.
2.1 Demand
Consider household h that consumes z units of a homogeneous good and one unit of a
di¤erentiated good k of quality qi; with i = H;L. Following Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) the
utility attained from consuming a combination of the homogeneous and di¤erentiated good
is assumed to have the following form7
uhik = zqi + 
h
ik: (1)
The term hik is a residual that describes among others the idiosyncratic valuation of house-
hold h of product k with quality i. It is specied as
hik = i"
h
i + if"
h
if + ik"
h
ifk;
where the subscript f refers to rms and k to a brand provided by rm f . The "h terms
are household-specic shocks of which "i is a quality shock; "if is a rm-specic shock and
"ifk denotes a taste-for-brand shock. The  terms measure the degree of heterogeneity: i
measures the degree of heterogeneity between the two quality groups; if measures the de-
gree of heterogeneity among rm in the same quality group; ik measures the heterogeneity
among products from the same rm. The larger i; the greater is the degree of hetero-
geneity among di¤erent quality goods and when i approaches zero; consumers consider
products of di¤erent quality as perfect substitutes.
Given household hs income, yh; and the price rm f charges for good k of quality
qi, pifk; a household chooses the di¤erentiated variety of quality qi that yields the highest
utility. The remaining income (yh  pifk) is spend on the homogeneous good z. The deter-
ministic part of the utility function exhibits a complementarity between the homogeneous
and di¤erentiated good that leads to the non-homotheticity in the aggregate demand: the
marginal utility of quality increases with higher consumption of the homogeneous good z.
A richer household that spends a larger fraction of its income on the homogeneous good z
experiences a larger marginal utility of quality.
We assume that the distribution of "hi ; "
h
if and "
h
ifk is such that the disturbances i"
h
ifk;
if"
h
if + ik"
h
ifk and i"
h
i + if"
h
if + ik"
h
ifk are distributed independently and identically
across the population according to a generalized extreme value distribution. As shown by
7Di Comte et al. (2014) consider also idiosyncratic consumer taste using a quasi-linear model where
the di¤erentiated good enters with a quadratic sub-utility allowing for horizontal and vertical product
di¤erentiation. However, their focus is very di¤erent from ours.
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McFadden (1978) and Ben Akiva et al. (1993), the distributional assumptions about the "s
allow us to model consumers choice as a sequential process in which rst the quality level qi
(or also known as nest) is chosen with (marginal) probability i; then, conditional on the
choice of quality, a particular rm is chosen with probability f ji; and, nally, conditional
on the choice of rm, a particular brand is selected with probability kji;f : Hence, the joint
probability that a consumer endowed with income y chooses brand k of quality qi sold by
rm f can be expressed as the product of two conditional probabilities and the marginal
probability, namely,
ifk(y) = kji;f  f ji  i(y): (2)
The three choice levels are described by logit models and are given by
kji;f =
e pifkqi=ikPmif
h=1 e
 pifhqi=ik
=
e pifkqi=ik
eIif=ik
(3)
f ji =
eIif=ifPni
j=1 e
Iij=if
=
eIif=if
eIi=if
(4)
i(y) =
e(yqi+Ii)=iP!
l=1 e
(yql+Il)=l ; (5)
with mif representing the number of products of rm f with quality i, ni denoting the
number of rms in quality class i and ! the number of quality classes (as i = H;L we have
! = 2). The sequential decision process is illustrated in Figure 1.8 Iif and Ii are so-called
inclusive values that are given by
Iif  ik ln
"
mifX
h=1
e pifhqi=ik
#
; Ii  if ln
"
niX
j=1
eIij=if
#
i = H;L: (6)
The inclusive values convey information from the lower level (nest), for example, the choice
of a particular brand from rm f , to the higher level, the choice of rm of quality qi.
For example, Iif measures the expected utility that household h receives from the choice
among alternative brands o¤ered by rm f . Likewise, Ii is the expected benet household
h attains from the choice among the alternative brands o¤ered by rms o¤ering goods of
quality qi.9
The various parameters denoted by  measure the degree of correlation among al-
ternatives within a subgroup, with a larger  indicating less correlation between the er-
ror term ". The nested logit model is consistent with random-utility maximization for
8Even though households may not actually make decisions sequentially, the structure generates reason-
able correlation patterns among unobserved (by the econometrician) factors across the alternatives needed
to study household decision processes, see Goldberger (1995).
9See Train (2003), chapter 4 for a detailed discussion.
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Figure 1: Demand side
0  ik  if  i  1. Without loss of generality we set i = 1; i = H;L: The parameters
ik and if can be interpreted as measures of intra- and inter-rm heterogeneity respec-
tively and can be inferred from the calculations of two cross price elasticities. Assuming
there are ni rms in quality class i, each selling mi varieties at price pi; the cross price
elasticity of demand for brands from di¤erent rms in quality class i is piqi=nimiif , while
the cross price elasticity of demand for brands from the same rm in quality class i equals
(piqi=nimi)[ni=ik   (ni   1)=if ]. The two cross price elasticities are equal if if = ik:
In this case, brands and rms cannot be distinguished   equal intra- and inter-rm het-
erogeneity   and the nested logit model reduces in essence to the model of Fajgelbaum
et al. (2011). When if > ik; the latter elasticity is larger than the former implying
that consumers consider brands from the same rm as closer substitutes to each other than
brands of the same quality o¤ered by a competitor.
The error term hik in (1) implies that not every rich household chooses to buy a higher
quality good nor does every poor household fancy a low-quality one. However, one should
expect that richer households on average consume more the higher quality good (i.e., the
probability of consuming the higher quality good rises with income). Looking at equation
6
(2) this key property of non-homothetic preferences is satised if
1
Hfk(y)
@Hfk(y)
@y
=
1
H(y)
@H(y)
@y
> 0 (7)
, qH   qa(y) > 0;
where qa(y) = H(y)qH + L(y)qL is the average quality consumed by households with in-
come y. The share of households who purchase the higher quality good, therefore, increases
with increasing income at all income levels if and only if qH is larger than the average qual-
ity consumed by households in this income group. Since we consider two quality classes
(qH > qL); we require qH > qa(y) > qL for all y.
With N the total number of households in the economy, the aggregate demand for
variety k of quality qi o¤ered by rm f is
difk = N
Z 1
ymin
ifk(y)dFy(y) (8)
= Nkji;f  f ji 
Z 1
ymin
i(y)  dFy(y)
= Nkji;f  f ji  E[i(y)]
where ymin is the minimum income of the poorest household in the country. By denition
E[i(y)] 
R1
ymin
i(y)dFy(y) denotes the expected value of i(y) with respect to the income
distribution Fy(y):
2.2 Costs and prots of multi-product rms
The nested logit model is used to characterize the demand perceived by a rm which sells
multiple products of the same quality. We assume that varieties o¤ered by the same rm are
closer substitutes than varieties of the same quality o¤ered by di¤erent rms. To this end
we require the intra-rm heterogeneity, ik, to be smaller than the inter-rm heterogeneity,
if ; for all i.
10
There are ni rms in each of the di¤erentiated goods industries, for i = H;L. A rm in
industry i can produce any number mif  1 of varieties subject to three types of cost, all
measured in terms of labor. First, there is a xed overhead cost of Ki the rm must bear
irrespective of the number of products o¤ered. Second, a rm has to pay a brand-variety
xed cost of Fi. This cost might represent the price of acquiring a patent or the marketing
10See Dhingra (2013) for references citing empirical evidence: e.g., using supermarket data Broda and
Weinstein (2010) nd that various brands of the same company are closer substitutes than brands across
di¤erent companies.
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of the product. Finally, a rm incurs a constant marginal cost ci: The total prot function
of a rm producing mif variants of quality qi at price pifk per variety therefore is
if =
mifX
k=1
(pifk   ci) difk   Fimif  Ki for i = H;L (9)
where difk is dened by (8). Each rm has to make a decision about the price structure
and the number of products maximizing prots.
Next, we derive the multi-product rm equilibrium given the nested demand structure.
We make use of results obtained in Anderson and de Palma (1992) for multi-product rms.
2.3 Product range and pricing of multi-product rms
We assume that rms play a sequential game: in the rst stage a rm decides to enter one
of the two quality markets; in the second stage, active rms decide how many variants to
produce before the price structure is determined.11 We solve the game recursively starting
with the short-run equilibrium analysis were the number of rms in each market is taken
as given. In the long run, rms are allowed to enter or exit depending on their protability.
The analysis is simplied by considering a symmetric equilibrium in which rms of quality
qi supply the same number of varieties.
Starting with the short-run equilibrium analysis we make two assumptions with regard
to the price setting behavior of rms. First, we assume that a rm coordinates its pricing
decision across its product range, which is also known as cannibalization. Second, we
assume that the market structure within each industry is oligopolistic but that there is no
strategic interaction between markets of di¤erent quality. This implies that rms take i(y)
as given.12
Removing the strategic interaction among rms producing goods of the same quality,
that is assuming monopolistic competition instead, generates an equilibrium of limited
interest because neither a change in the income distribution nor a change in the country
size, N , would impact the price or the range of varieties produced per rm. While we
assume strategic interaction within markets, across markets of di¤erent quality there is no
strategic interaction which allows us to apply the results of Anderson and de Palma (1992)
for i = H;L separately. We provide the necessary details here to t our general equilibrium
framework.
11Eckel and Neary (2010), on the other hand, assume a single-stage Cournot game.
12Bernard et al. (2011) and Mayer et al. (2014) assume there is no strategic interaction within and
between rms. Eckel and Neary (2010), in a one sector economy, allow for strategic interaction across rms
in a single market.
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To solve for the price subgame, we make use of the partial derivatives: @kji;f=@pifk
=  qi=ik[kji;f (1   kji;f )]; @f ji=@pifk = (qif ji(f ji   1)kji;f )=if ; and @hji;f=@pifk =
qi=ik[kji;fhji;f ]: The rst order condition of (9) with respect to pifk yields
(pifk   ci) = ik
qi
+

1  ik
if
 
1  f ji
 mifX
h=1
(pifh   ci) hji;f (10)
for k 2 mif , f 2 ni; and i = H;L: Since if > ik; the mark-up of the price over marginal
cost is positive. Clearly, the mark-up is the same for all brand varieties, so that pifk = pif :
The presence of the probability weighted summation of all brand mark-ups in (10) reects
the cannibalization e¤ect: a reduction in the price of one brand leads a reduction in the
prices for all other brands supplied by the same rm.
Since we are interested in a symmetric equilibrium in the second stage, we consider the
case where all rms except rm f have mi  1 brands while rm f has mif > 0 brands so
that the mark-up over marginal cost simplies to
(pif   ci) =
if
qi
1
(1  f ji)
(11)
(pij   ci) =
if
qi
1
(1  jji)
; j = 1; ::; ni with j 6= f (12)
for i = H;L: In contrast to Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), the absolute mark-up depends not
only on if and the quality class qi, but also on f ji; the conditional probability that rm
f will be chosen given that a consumer decided to purchase quality i. The presence of f ji
in the pricing strategy implies that the mark-up depends on the number of rms producing
quality i: The number of active rms in the di¤erentiated sector i, in turn, depends on the
income distribution, as we will demonstrate further below.
As is apparent from equations (11) and (12), the parameters if and qi a¤ect the mark-
up in opposite direction. On the one hand, a smaller value of if leads to a reduction in the
mark-up over marginal cost as variants from rms in the same quality group are consid-
ered to become closer substitutes in the eyes of consumers, rendering varieties more price
sensitive, all else being the same. On the other hand, a lower qi, ceteris paribus, reduces
the marginal utility from consuming the homogeneous goods (as implied by equation (1)),
rendering di¤erentiated varieties less price elastic.
Following Anderson and de Palma (1992), we recognize pij = pi for all j 6= f and express
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the conditional probabilities f ji and jji used in (11) and (12) as
f ji =
(mif )
ik=if exp[ pifqi=if ]
(ni   1)(mi)ik=if exp[ piqi=if ] + (mif )ik=if exp[ pifqi=if ]
(13)
jji =
(mi)
ik=if exp[ piqi=if ]
(ni   1)(mi)ik=if exp[ piqi=if ] + (mif )ik=if exp[ pifqi=if ]
; (14)
j 2 ni with j 6= f; for i = H;L: Equation (11) then provides a unique pif given pij = pi,
while equation (12) provides a unique pi for given pif . The proof of existence of a unique
price equilibrium (pif ; pi) of the subgame at which rm f has mif variants and all other
rms have mi variants then directly follows from Anderson and de Palma (1992). Their
proof is based on the fact that the di¤erence between (12) and (11) can be expressed as
{i =

1
(ni   2) +Mi exp{i  
Mi exp{i
(ni   1)

(15)
with {i  (pi  pif )qi=if andMi  (mif=mi)(ik=if ) ; which has a unique solution in {i as
the left hand side of (15) is increasing in {i while the right hand side is decreasing in {i:
We now turn to a rms optimal choice of number of varieties. To this end, consider
rm f that sells mif variants at price pif , while its closest (ni   1) competitors o¤er mi
brands at a price pi; for i = H;L. As before, we abstain from strategic interaction between
sectors of di¤erent quality and can therefore treat each quality i = H;L; symmetrically. At
the second stage, the prot function of rm f is
eif = (pif   ci)Nf jiE[i(y)] mifFi  Ki; (16)
where i(y), using the above notation, simplies to
f ji =
Mi exp{i
(ni   1) +Mi exp{i : (17)
Given the pricing strategy (11), the prot function can be expressed as
eif = N
(ni   1)
if
qi
E[i(y)]

mif
mi
(ik=if )
exp{i  mifFi  Ki: (18)
The rst order condition with respect to the scope of production, mif ; is:
N
(ni   1)
if
qi
E[i(y)]

mif
mi
(ik=if )
exp{i

ik
if
1
mif
+
@{i
@mif

  Fi = 0;
where @{i=@mif captures the e¤ect a change in mif has on competitorsprices. Evaluating
the rst order condition at a symmetric equilibrium, where mif = mi; yields
N
ik
qi
E[i(y)]

ni   1
n2i   ni + 1

= miFi: (19)
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Since E[i(y)] is a function of mL and mH ; equation (19) for i = H;L provides a system
of equations that implicitly denes the equilibrium number of brands per rm given the
number of rms.
3 Autarky Equilibrium
3.1 Short-run autarky equilibrium
Analogous to Anderson and de Palma (see proof in Appendix 7.10.4 of Anderson et al.
1992), it can be shown that mLf = mL is the number of brands that maximizes rm fs
prots for quality qL; given all other low quality rms choose mL and all high quality rms
choose mH . At a symmetric equilibrium, where rms o¤er the same range of brands and
charge the price for each brand, aggregate demand for a typical brand of quality qi o¤ered
by rm f can be expressed as
dif =
N
mini
E[i(y)] (20)
with
E[i(y)] = E

n
if
i m
ik
i i(y; ni)
n
Hf
H m
Hk
H H(y; nH) + n
Lf
L m
Lk
L L(y; nL)

; (21)
where
i(y; ni)  exp
h
(y   ci)qi   if ni(ni 1)
i
; (22)
and corresponding equilibrium prices (here f ji simplies to 1=ni)
pi = ci +
if
qi
ni
ni   1 : (23)
The term i(y; ni) captures the e¤ect of income and price on the probability of choosing a
good of quality qi; for i = H;L. The price e¤ect works through a change in the number
of rms. An increase in the number of rms producing quality, say qL; lowers the price for
these varieties relative to the price of high-quality brands thereby making it more likely
that the fraction of households purchasing low-quality goods increases.13 This contrasts
with Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), where this additional price e¤ect is absent due to their
assumption of monopolistic competition.
The short-run autarky equilibrium of the two stage product range and the subsequent
price game, with ni rms each choosing mi varieties given by (19) and then charging a
price given by (23), is illustrated in Figure 2. The short-run equilibrium is unique with
13For strictly positive if=qi; as ni ! 1; we are back in the monopolistic competition setting, where
the mark-up of the price over marginal cost is constant (positive).
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Figure 2: Short-run autarky equilibrium
mH > 0 and mL > 0.14 The mLL and mHH curves show combinations of mL and mH for
which the rst order conditions (19) are satised. The two curves are negatively sloped as
an expansion in the product range of a rm in one quality sector requires the reduction in
the product range of a rm in the other product class to preserve protability.
Before turning to the long-run equilibrium, where the number of rms are endogenous,
we rst discuss how the short-run equilibrium is related to the population size, the income
distribution and the number of rms.
An increase in the population size, N , will lead to an increase in the optimal scope mi.
In terms of Figure 2, both mLL and mHH curves shift to the right. When Hk = Lk; the
number of brands, mi; increases equiproportionally since the perceived di¤erences among
the various brands across quality classes are the same, while the number of brands o¤ered
by rms with low-quality increases relatively more, bmH < bmL; when Hk < Lk:15 The
quantitative e¤ects are given in equations (A.7) and (A.8) in Appendix A.
To evaluate the e¤ect of a change in the income distribution, we consider two popular
scenarios: rst, we shift the cumulative income distribution, Fy(y); downwards (so that the
new distribution has rst-order stochastic dominance over the former) and second we shift
14The short-run equilibrium is unique and stable as the determinant of the coe¢ cient matrix given in
equation (A.3) in Appendix A is always positive.
15A circumex above a variable denotes a proportional change, i.e. bm = dm=m:
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the cumulative income distribution in such a way that the weight is shifted from the center
towards the tails while holding the mean constant (also called mean preserving spread).16
When we shift Fy(y) to the right, the fraction of the population with an income less
than or equal to y decreases for all income levels; the economy becomes richer. For a given
population size and number of rms in each quality class, demand shifts away from low-
quality goods to high-quality goods. The change in the relative protability in favour of
high-quality goods ensures that rms within that quality class increase their product range
while the opposite takes place in low-quality sector, i.e. bmH > 0 and bmL < 0. The relative
increase in the number of brands with quality qH is smaller than the relative fall in the
number of brands with quality qL, i.e. jbmH j < jbmLj : In terms of Figure 2, the mLL curve
shifts to the left while the mHH curve shifts to the right, with the latter shift relatively
larger than the former. See equations (A.9) and (A.10) in Appendix A.
With a mean preserving spread, the variance of income increases without changing the
expectation implying an increase in income inequality (as reected by the Lorenz curve).
Starting from an economy in which the number of households in all income classes demand
more low-quality goods relative to high-quality goods, i.e. L(y) > H(y) for all y, this
increase in income inequality will inuence the product range of both sectors in the same
way as the previous scenario. See equations (A.13) and (A.14) in Appendix A.
Quantitatively the di¤erential impact associated with these changes in the income dis-
tribution is determined by the magnitude they have on the fraction of households purchas-
ing the high-quality good (E(H(y)); in the case of rst stochastic dominance given by
E(L(y)H(y))(qL   qH), versus dE(H(y))=d in the case of a mean preserving spread,
with  parameterizing the mean preserving spread.
The e¤ect of an increase in the number of rms producing low-quality goods on the
range of brands per rm turns out to be ambiguous:
bmLbnL = 1D1Lf HLL

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

  1
D1

1  Hk
HL
H

n2L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
(24)
bmHbnL =   1D1 HLH Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

+
1
D1
HL
H
Lk
n2L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
; (25)
where D1 > 0; i  E(i(y)); i = L;H, and HL  E(L(y)H(y)); Jensens inequality
ensures HL  HL. We can decompose these e¤ects in a selection (rst term) and
competition (second term) e¤ect.
The selection e¤ect reects the impact a higher nL exerts on the probability of choosing
respectively a low-quality good and a high-quality good. It consists of two components. On
16We also say, the new distribution is second-order stochastically dominated, or Lorenz dominated by
the former. Stochastic dominance and its relation to inequality is discussed, e.g., in Davidson (2008).
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the one hand, having more rms in the low-quality industry qL, makes it more likely that
a rm and one of its products will be selected. This provides an incentive for these rms
to increase the range of varieties in this quality class while reducing the probability that
a good from the high-quality industry is chosen. On the other hand, a higher nL reduces
the price of low-quality goods relative to high quality goods, providing consumers at all
income levels with an incentive to substitute away from the high-quality goods towards
the low-quality goods. Overall, the selection e¤ect ensures that an increase in nL raises
mL and lowers mH :17 The competition e¤ect reects the impact a higher nL exerts on the
protability among low (high) quality rms. Having more rms in the market for goods of
quality qL, reduces (increases) the protability of low (high) quality rms which leads to a
decrease (increase) in the range of low (high) quality brands, i.e. dmL < 0 and dmH > 0.
Which of the two e¤ects dominate depends on the interaction of the number of rms
and the value of the two parameters measuring the degree of heterogeneity, Lf and Lk:
the smaller the di¤erence between (Lf  Lk) > 0; the larger nL has to be for the selection
e¤ect to dominate the competition e¤ect and the overall e¤ect to be negative on the number
of high-quality varieties (dmH < 0). Intuitively the larger the number of nL rms active
in the market for given Lf > Lk; the smaller the competition e¤ect and the price e¤ect
when an additional rms enters in the low-quality range; this increases the net selection
e¤ect thereby reducing the high-quality rms range of products dmH < 0. While the net
e¤ect onmL is ambiguous, a sum of probability weighted relative changes is unambiguously
negative:
L
bmLbnL + H bmHbnL =  L n2L(nL 2)(n2L nL+1)(nL 1) < 0:
Since the relative change in mH is negative for nL su¢ ciently high and Lf > Lk; the
range of low-quality brands mL can increase with an increasing number of rms in qL.18
In Appendix A we show that for the long run equilibrium to be stable, the selection e¤ect
cannot dominate the competition e¤ect.
3.2 Long-run autarky equilibrium
So far we have treated the number of rms as being given. In the long-run, however, ni is
determined by the free entry zero prot condition for rm qi: Substituting (19) into (18)
17Note, the selection e¤ect is decreasing in ni and converges towards one as ni approaches innity.
18In case the market structure is monopolistic competitive, both mL and mH unambiguously fall with a
higher number of rms in quality class i; for i = H;L, see Schafgans and Stibora (2012).
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yields the following prot functions:
i(nH ; nL) =
N
qi
E[i(y)]
"
(if   ik) (ni   1)2 + ifni
(ni   1) (n2i   ni + 1)
#
 Ki; (26)
for i = H;L; where if > ik by assumption. We will use these prot functions to determine
the e¤ective number of rms producing in equilibrium. As long as prots are positive rms
will enter the market for quality good qi; they exit otherwise. The ow of rms in and out
of each industry can be described by two di¤erential equations of the form

ni = nii(nH ; nL);
where a dot above a variable indicates di¤erentiation with respect to time, i.e.,

ni  dni=dt.
In the long run, or in steady state,

ni = 0 and nH > 1 and nL > 1 as H(nH ; nL) =
L(nH ; nL) = 0:
19 Once the number of rms in each quality class is known, the number
of brands per rm of quality qi is determined from (19) and subsequently the price and
sales of each brand is established. This allows us to determine the total sales per quality
group, equalling nimidif : Since each household purchases only one unit of the di¤erentiated
good, the aggregate sales of all di¤erentiated products satises the condition nHmHdHf +
nLmLdLf = N:
Labor market clearing, furthermore, requires that the demand for e¤ective labor in
di¤erentiated and homogeneous good production equals the economys aggregate supply:X
i=H;L
ni [mi (Ncidif + Fi) +Ki] + Lz = N
Z 1
ymin
ydFy(y);
where Lz denotes the e¤ective labor used in the homogeneous good industry. Given ni
and mi this gives us the labor demand for the di¤erentiated goods sector. Taking the
di¤erence between the total labor supply and the demand of labor for the di¤erentiated
goods yields the labor demand for the homogeneous sector. Applying WalrasLaw allows
us to concentrate on the long-run market equilibrium for di¤erentiated products, to which
we turn next.
For a rm producing mi brands of quality qi to be active, total output has to cover the
xed headquarters cost, Ki; in the long-run a rm has to break even. Let mixi dene the
total quantity of output of quality qi a rm has to produce in order to break-even when
its products are priced according to (23) and the optimal scope is given by (19). Total
quantity of output then has to satisfy:
mixi =
qiKi
ni
"
(ni   1) (n2i   ni + 1)
(if   ik) (ni   1)2 + ifni
#
; (27)
19As is standard practice in the trade literature we ignore the integer constraint on ni and mi.
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for i = H;L: The break-even output depends on the xed headquarters costKi and crucially
on the number of rms ni: a higher number of rms reduces the price of varieties thereby
requiring a larger total output for a rm to break even. Firms that produce goods of
quality qi base their entry-exit decision on the comparison of the break-even volume with
the expected demand for their products. Firms will not produce if demand falls short of
supply, midif < mixi. In equilibrium total output of all di¤erentiated products produced
has to be equal the population size N; orX
i=L;H
nimixi = N; (28)
indicating that at least nH or nL has to be positive. In light of (20), if mini ! 0 while
mi0ni0 > 0; i 6= i0; the demand dif approaches innity. This means that a rm producing
mi brands of quality qi will certainly be able to produce the break-even output when the
number of its competitors o¤ering a similar quality is su¢ ciently small as the break even
output per brand falls while at the same time the price of the brand increases, see (23). As
a result, in the autarky equilibrium both quality types exists with nimi > 0; for i = H;L:
Market equilibrium in the di¤erentiated good sector then requires that mixi = midif ; for
i = H;L; which combined with (20) can equivalently be expressed as
mixi =
N
ni
E

n
if
i m
ik
i i(y; ni)
n
Hf
H m
Hk
H H(y; nH) + n
Lf
L m
Lk
L L(y; nL)

; (29)
for i = H;L: The autarky equilibrium is described by the seven equations (19), (27), (28),
(29) six of of which are independent. These six equilibrium conditions determine the six
endogenous variables: nH , nL, mH , mL; xH ; and xL, which subsequently determine all
remaining variables.
In Appendix A we provide the technical details of the following propositions:
Proposition 1 There exits a stable and unique autarky equilibrium with nH > 2 and
nL > 2 and mH  1 and mL  1 as long as (i) the competition e¤ect dominates the quality
selection e¤ect (see, A.19) and (ii) the e¤ect of a change in ni on the operating prots of
a rm from the same sector i dominates the e¤ect on the operating prots from a change
in the number of rms in the other sector, nj, for i; j = H;L, and i 6= j (see, A.20).
Part (i) of the claim can best be illustrated by considering Figure 3. Figure 3 depicts the
prot function (26) for a rm producing qi. The operating prots are driven by a selection
e¤ect (the probability of selecting quality qi) and a competition e¤ect (the term in large
square brackets in equation (26)). Suppose current prots i(nH ; nL) > 0: This will cause
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Figure 3: Long-run autarky equilibrium
new rms to enter that want to exploit these prot opportunities. With a higher number
of rms in sector i, competition increases and operating prots decrease, ceteris paribus.
As the number of rms increases it becomes more likely that a consumer selects a brand
of quality qi, which increases operating prots, given ni. As long as the competition e¤ect
dominates the selection e¤ect will there be a unique equilibrium as shown in Figure 3.20
We are now in the position to analyze how a change in the population size, N , and the
income distribution, Fy(y), will a¤ect the long-run equilibrium, that is how it will a¤ect
the number of rms, each rms scope and scale of products with its corresponding price
e¤ects.
When considering an increase in the population size we have to discern two e¤ects.
First, a higher N provides an incentive for incumbent rms in both sectors to increase
their range of products, dmi > 0. Second, it provides an incentive for new rms to enter,
dni > 0. Both, a larger range of products per rm (given the number of rms) and the
entry of new rms (given the range of products per rm) reduce protability in each sector,
thereby diminishing the incentive for new rms to enter or for established rms to increase
their product line, respectively. The number of new rms could increase to the point where
20The stable and unique long run equilibrium can be represented in a graph like Figure 2 by replacing
mi for ni on the axes, relabelling the curves mii to nii. The stability analysis, provided in the Appendix,
demonstrates the negative slope of the curves.
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established rms have no incentive to o¤er a wider product line.21 In Appendix A we show
that in a two-stage product line price game with nested logit demand and free entry and
exit both the equilibrium number of brands per rm and the equilibrium number of rms
increase:bnibN = D1D2
n
'i   ik HLHL

'i   n
2
i (ni 2)
(n2i ni+1)(ni 1)

  if HLHH

1 + ni
(ni 1)2
o
> 0;
with D1 > 0 and D2 > 0; andbmibN =

'i   n
2
i (ni 2)
(n2i ni+1)(ni 1)
 bnibN > 0;
for ni > 2; i = H;L: The relative change in the range of products and number of rms is
proportional, with the factor of proportionality given by 'i  n
2
i (ni 2)
(n2i ni+1)(ni 1)
. The term 'i 
1 captures the e¤ect of rm entry on net total prots, see (A.18); the term n
2
i (ni 2)
(n2i ni+1)(ni 1)
measures the e¤ect of rm entry on product level prots, see (19). Which of the two e¤ects
dominates depends on the number of rms active in industry i. When ni > 3; this di¤erence
(positive) is smaller than 1, ensuring n^i > m^i > 0; in contrast, when ni = 2 the e¤ect on
the range of products always dominates, i.e., m^i > n^i > 0. For ni = 3; the e¤ect on rms
dominates as long as
if ik
if
is su¢ ciently large.22 With a larger range of brands per rm
and a larger number of rms, the scale of production decreases for rms to break even
(A.22). At the same time the larger number of rms increases competition forcing prices
per brand to fall (A.23). The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 An increase in the size of the economy in the long run leads to more rms
in both industries, each producing larger product lines with a smaller scale and lower prices.
That is bni; bmi > 0; bxi < 0; and dpi < 0 for i = H;L: The rms expansion e¤ect dominates
the product line expansion when there are already multiple (>3) rms in the industries;
when only two rms exist at the outset, the product line expansion dominates.
The increase in the size of the economy furthermore generates a shift in the composition
of the di¤erentiated products. There is a shift in composition of di¤erentiated goods toward
21If the assumed market structure would be monopolistic competitive, an increase in the population size
would increase the number of rms producing in each sector to such an extend that the range of products
per brand remains constant. That is, the number of rms would change but not the number of brands, see
Schafgans and Stibora (2012).
22With ni = 3; n^i > m^i > 0 as long as
if ik
if
> 3:45.
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the high-quality brands and rms, if the sign of
'H
bnHbN   'LbnLbN (30)
=
D1
D2
HL
HL
'H'L

Hf
'H

1 +
nH
(nH   1)2

  Lf
'L

1 +
nL
(nL   1)2

+
Hk
'H

'H  
n2H(nH   2)
(n2H   nH + 1)(nH   1)

  Lk
'L

'L  
n2L(nL   2)
(n2L   nL + 1)(nL   1)

:
is positive. The relative changes in nH and nL are multiplied by respectively 'H and 'L
to take into account the fact that the marginal impact is not constant but depends on
the initial number of rms active in each industry. If the number of active rms is the
same in both industries (i.e., nH = nL) and all ' terms are equal an increase in the size
of the economy will shift the composition of di¤erentiated goods towards the high-quality
brands and rms given Hk > Lk and Hf > Lf (that is assuming that households
consider brands and rms of low-quality as closer substitutes than brands and rms of
high-quality). A more reasonable set of assumptions is that there is a larger number of
rms with low-quality brands (nL > nH) and a relatively smaller marginal impact of an
additional low-quality rm ('L < 'H). As a result of these di¤erent marginal impacts,
larger di¤erences Hk Lk and Hf  Lf are needed to ensure that the composition e¤ect
continuous to favour the high quality sector. The di¤erence in marginal impacts o¤set the
selection and competition e¤ects which both favour the high quality brand. We summarize
this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When nL > nH ; an increase in the size of the economy is more likely to
be accompanied by a shift in its composition to the high-quality rms the more dissimilar
consumers perceive the brands and rms of high and low-quality goods. When nL = nH ; an
increase in the size of the economy is always accompanied by a shift towards high-quality
rms and products.
Next we consider the consequences of changing the income distribution. First, we shift
the income distribution Fy(y) downwards, in the sense of rst order stochastic dominance.
For given population size N , with a higher income in each income class consumers are more
likely to choose a high-quality brand instead of a low-quality one. The shift in demand
away from low-quality brands towards high-quality ones provides an incentive for new rms
to enter the high-quality sector and for rms producing low-quality brands to exitbnH
dy
=  'LD1
D2
HL
H
[qL   qH ] > 0bnL
dy
=
'HD1
D2
HL
L
[qL   qH ] < 0;
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while at the same time for rms producing high (low) quality goods to o¤er a wider (smaller)
range of brands bmi
dy
=

'i   n
2
i (ni 2)
(n2i ni+1)(ni 1)
 bni
dy
;
for i = H;L; with the relative change in the range of products and number of rms propor-
tional as before. The additional competition brought about by the entrance of new rms
pushes down the prices of high-quality goods relative to the prices in the low-quality sector:
dpi
dy
=  if
qi
ni
(ni   1)2
bni
dy
:
Associated with the increased number of high-quality rms each o¤ering a wider range
of brands, the scale of production will be reduced so as to break even (reverse argument
holding for low-quality rms):
bxi
dy
= (2ni 1)
(n2i ni+1)(ni 1)
bni
dy
:
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 An increase in income (rst order stochastic dominance) leads to more
high-quality rms, each producing a larger number of variants at a smaller scale with lower
prices in the long-run equilibrium. The opposite occurs in the low-quality sector and the
compositional of di¤erentiated goods therefore clearly shifts towards high-quality brands.
That is bnL < 0 < bnH ; bmL < 0 < bmH ; bxH < 0 < bxL; dpL > 0; and dpH < 0:
The e¤ect of an increase in income inequality has similar consequences under the as-
sumption that H(y) is a convex increasing function of y: The qualitative di¤erence em-
anates as before from the e¤ect these income distributional changes have on the fraction of
households purchasing the high-quality good.
Proposition 5 If L(y) > H(y) for all y, an increase in income inequality (second order
stochastic dominance) leads to more high-quality rms, each producing a larger number of
variants at a smaller scale with lower prices in the long-run equilibrium. The opposite occurs
in the low-quality sector and the compositional of di¤erentiated goods therefore clearly shifts
towards high-quality brands. That is bnL < 0 < bnH ; bmL < 0 < bmH ; bxH < 0 < bxL; dpL > 0;
and dpH < 0:
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3.3 Welfare
We next turn to the welfare implications associated with the previous analysis. In our
model, the expected maximum utility of a household with income y; E[maxU(y)]; is given
by23
ln
 
n
Lf
L m
Lk
L exp ((y   pL) qL) + n
Hf
H m
Hk
H exp ((y   pH) qH)

:
The expected maximum utility is increasing with income and welfare therefore is enhanced
as a result of a rst order stochastic dominating change in the income distribution. Since
the expected marginal utility of income is increasing, @2E(maxU(y))=@2y > 0; the mean
preserving spread improves welfare as well.24
These welfare implications ignore the fact that fnH ; nL;mH ;mLg will change as well,
and the associated compositional changes in the relative number of brands and rms due
to a distributional change in income and the population size (discussed in detail in the
previous section) may a¤ect income groups di¤erently. To analyze this, we turn now to the
expected welfare for a household with income y. With
v(y)  nHfH mHkH H(y; nH)+ nLfL mLkL L(y; nL) ;
these e¤ects are provided by v^(y); which we derive in Appendix A. Acknowledging that
the relative changes in mi are proportional to the relative changes in ni; we decompose
the change in expected welfare for a household with income y into a pure scale and pure
composition e¤ect as Fajgelbaum et al. (2011):
v^(y) =
8<:
H(y)
H'H
h
Hf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

+ Hk

'H   n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
i
+L(y)
L'L
h
Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

+ Lk

'L   n
2
L(nL 1)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
i 9=; bN (31)
+HL
8><>:
h
H(y)
H
Hf
'H

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  L(y)
L
Lf
'L

1 + nL
(nL 1)2
i
+
h
H(y)
H
Hk
'H

'H   n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)

  L(y)
L
Lk
'L

'L   n
2
L(nL 1)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
i
9>=>;
 ('HbnH   'LbnL) ;
where i(y) denotes the fraction of consumers with income y who purchase di¤erentiated
brand qi and i is the fraction of all households purchasing di¤erentiated brand with quality
qi, respectively.
The pure scale e¤ect is denoted by the rst term on the right hand side of (31): holding
the relative number of brands and rms constant (n^L = n^H = 0), a larger market results in
23Uses results from McFadden (1978).
24Assuming social welfare to be the sum of individual utilities, a decrease in inequality is only welfare
improving if there is diminishing marginal (social) utility of income, see e.g., Davidson (2008).
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a larger number of rms each o¤ering more brands thereby increasing the likelihood that
a household nds his or her preferred brand. The pure scale e¤ect is non-negative and,
consequently, no income group is worse o¤ following an increase in the size of the economy.
There is no pure scale e¤ect when considering the welfare implications associated with
changes in the income distribution.
The pure composition e¤ect is denoted by the second term on the right hand side of
(31). It captures the welfare impact arising from changes in the relative number of rms
and brands of di¤erent quality, for given population size (N^ = 0). The sign of this term is
ambiguous and depends on the interaction of the parameters measuring degree of intra- and
inter-rm heterogeneity, the number of rms active in each di¤erentiated goodssector, the
purchasing behavior of households with income y relative to all households, the selection
e¤ect, and the strength of the competition e¤ects.
If the initial number of rms in both industries is large then the welfare analysis (31)
reduces to that of Fajgelbaum et al. (2011). In this limiting case of monopolistic compe-
tition both the change in the number of brands and the change in the price of brands are
absent in the change of the expected welfare as mi and pi are not a¤ected by changes in the
size of the population or the income distribution (which is the interesting contribution in
our paper). As a consequence, their composition e¤ect is purely driven by the parameter
measuring inter-rm heterogeneity, if ; and the purchasing behavior of particular income
groups relative to that of the total population, as measured by i(y)=i; for i = H;L: In our
case, the intra-rm heterogeneity parameters, ik, the competition e¤ect (represented by 'i
and n2i (ni 2)=[(n2i ni+1)(ni 1)]) and the selection e¤ect (represented by 1+ni=(ni 1)2)
enter as well.
Our welfare analysis simplies if we assume nL = nH (all ' terms are the same). In
that case, it is clear that the term in brackets associated with the composition e¤ect is
more likely to be positive for the richest income groups in the economy given Hk > Lk
and Hf > Lf . The richest income groups in the economy with income ymax buy a
larger fraction of high-quality brands and a smaller fraction of the low-quality brands than
the average household, i.e. H(ymax)=H > 1 > L(ymax)=L: Consequently any change
which induces the composition of rms to favour the high quality rms, i.e., for which
'HbnH  'LbnL > 0; will benet the rich more than the poor. The poor, who are more likely
than average to purchase the low-quality good and less likely than average to consume the
high-quality good, are more likely to benet if consumers perceive the brands and rms of
high and low-quality goods as more dissimilar. When nL > nH ; a larger brand and rm
dissimilarity is needed to ensure even the rich benet.
The condition that ensures that both the pure scale and pure composition welfare e¤ect
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benet the rich more than the poor is automatically satised by the income distributional
changes considered (rst order stochastic dominance and mean preserving spread) as both
favour the high-quality sector more than the low-quality sector. In fact, while the poor
will see their welfare increase by these income changes, their pure composition e¤ect may
be negative (in which case the positive pure scale e¤ect dominates the negative pure com-
position e¤ect); a negative composition e¤ect for the poor is less likely when brands and
rms of high and low-quality are perceived to be very dissimilar. A similar discussion fol-
lows regarding the welfare implications  favouring the rich more than the poor of an
increase in the size of the economy, when it also favours the high-quality sector more than
the low-quality sector, see Proposition (3).
4 Open economy
In this section we evaluate how, in the presence of non-homothetic preferences and vertical
product di¤erentiation, trade liberalization a¤ects the number of rms and brands per
rm. To this end, we extend the previous framework to allow for two countries that can
trade with one another. We abstract from supply side explanations, thereby allowing us to
concentrate on the trade liberalization e¤ects in the presence of non-homothetic preferences
and oligopolistic market structure.
We consider the countries a and b. In each country, there are Na (N b) households with
identical preferences given by (1). As before, we assume that the homogeneous goods
industry is perfectly competitive, producing under constant returns to scale with one unit
of e¤ective labor per unit of output in both countries. Their output is traded freely. With
regard to the di¤erentiated goodssectors, rms can sell their brands in both countries but
produce only in their home country, thereby abstracting from multinationals. Assuming
that the supply of labor in each country is su¢ cient to produce both the homogeneous and
the di¤erentiated goods, the wage rate is the same in both countries and is independent of
the equilibrium in the di¤erentiated goodssector.
In line with a large body of empirical literature, rms have to incur cost when trading
in di¤erentiated goods. For simplicity, we assume that each brand of quality qi faces the
same transportation cost, but that transportation costs di¤er across quality classes. More
specically, it takes  i units of e¤ective labor to trade one unit of a brand with quality qi
from one country to the other, for i = H;L. The presence of transportation cost drives
a wedge between the consumer and producer price of a brand. We assume that each rm
considers markets to be segmented so that a rm chooses a di¤erent price of the same brand
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in each market. Hence, the prot function of rm f from country a and b are given by
aif =
maifX
k=1
 
paifk   ci

daifk +
 
pabifk   ci   L

dabifk)
  Fimaif  Ki (32)
bif =
mbifX
k=1
 
pbifk   ci

dbifk +
 
pbaifk   ci   L

dbaifk)
  Fimbif  Ki; (33)
respectively, where daifk (d
b
ifk) is the aggregate demand from local households for brand k
produced by rm f and dabifk (d
ba
ifk) is the aggregate demand for the same brand from foreign
households. The aggregate demand functions are specied as
daifk = N
aakji;f  af ji  Ea[ai (y)] (34)
dabifk = N
bakji;f  abf ji  Eb[bi(y)]; (35)
where Ea (Eb) denotes the expectation with respect to the income distribution of country
a (b). The conditional probability akji;f is dened as in (3). The conditional probability
that a domestic brand from rm f is purchased by consumers from country a (b) is af ji
(bf ji); similarly the conditional probability that consumers from country b (a) select rm f
originating from country a (b) is abf ji (
ba
f ji), see also (4) and (5).
Since the analytical complexity increases considerably, we consider two particular cases.
In the rst case, we assume that the rich country produces both high-quality and low-
quality goods, while the poor country is specialized in the production of low-quality goods
only. We characterize its associated short-run equilibrium. In the second case, we assume
that both countries are completely specialized with the rich country producing the high-
quality goods and the poor country the low quality goods. Here we characterize both the
short- and long-run equilibrium. Both production patterns can occur in our framework if
the income distribution of the rich country (country a) rst (second)-order stochastically
dominates the income distribution of the poor country (country b) given market sizes, that
is Fay (y)  F by(y); for all y.25
4.1 Trade with incomplete specialization
Let us assume that the rich country produces both types of di¤erentiated goods while the
poor country only produces the low-quality good. When a rm exports a unit of output it
has to pay  i > 0 units of transportation, i = H;L. As before, we adopt the symmetric
equilibrium of the sequential game where rms rst decide on the range of products before
determining the price structure.
25Hallak (2006) and Hallak and Schott (2011) show that the quality level is correlated with development.
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First, we evaluate the price setting for products sold in country a assuming that all
rms in a except rm f; have mai  1 brands while rm f has maif brands, and all rms
from country b have mbL  1 brands (mbH = 0 since only rms in country a produce the H
good). The mark-up over marginal cost of rms selling in a can be expressed as 
paif   ci

=
if
qi
1
(1  af ji)
; (36)
 
paij   ci

=
if
qi
1
(1  ajji)
j = 1; ::; nai j 6= f ; (37) 
pbaLj   cL   L

=
Lf
qL
1
(1  bajjL)
j = 1; ::; nbL: (38)
With the di¤erences of prices denoted by
ai =
 
pai   paif

qi=if , i = H;L
baL =
 
paL   pbaL

qL=Lf ;
(recognizing that pij = pi, j 6= f and pbaLj = pbaL ), the conditional probabilities can be
expressed as
af ji =
Mai exp (
a
i )
(nai   1) +Mai exp (ai ) + nbiM bai exp
 
bai

ajji =
1
(nai   1) +Mai exp (ai ) + nbiM bai exp
 
bai

bajjL =
M baL exp
 
baL

(naL   1) +MaL exp (aL) + nbLM baL exp
 
baL
 ;
where Mai  (maif=mai )
ik
if and M baL  (mbL=maL)
Lk
Lf (M baH = 0 because only rms in a
produce H): As in the closed economy setting, there is a unique solution for aH yielding a
unique price equilibrium (paH = p
a
Hf ): In Appendix B, it is shown that the resulting system
of equations in aL and 
ba
L (see (B.5) and (B.6)) also has a unique solution yielding a unique
price equilibrium (paL = p
a
Lf ; p
ba
L ). Equally, a unique price equilibrium for products sold in
b is found: for the H good (pabH = p
ab
Hf ) and for the L good
 
pabL = p
ab
Lf ; p
b
L

:
Next, we consider the optimal choice of number of varieties for rm f in country a.
Given the above pricing strategy, rm f maximizes his prots, i.e.,
max
maif
aif =
if
qi
"
af ji
(1  af ji)
NaEa[ai (y)] +
abf ji
(1  abf ji)
N bEb[bi(y)]
#
  Fimaif  Ki; i = H;L:
For high quality rms in country a, the prot function simplies to
aHf =
Hf
qH (naH   1)

NaEa[aH(y)] +N
bEb[bH(y)]
maHf
maH
Hk=Hf
exp (aH) FHmaHf KH ;
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as af jH = 
ab
f jH (
a
H dened as in (15)). Evaluating its rst order condition at a symmetric
equilibrium with maHf = m
a
H ; yields a condition similar to that of the closed economy,
specically
qH
Hk
maHFH =
 
NaEa [aH(y)] +N
bEb

bH(y)
  naH   1
(naH)
2   naH + 1

: (39)
For low quality rms in country a, the choice of the optimal range of brands that
maximizes prots becomes more complex. The rst order condition with respect to maLf is:
0 =
Naaf jL
(1  af jL)
Ea[aL(y)]
Lf
qL
(
Lk
Lf
1
maLf
+
daL
dmaLf
  
ba
jjL
(1  af jL)
nbL
dbaL
dmaLf
)
+
N babf jL
(1  abf jL)
Eb[bL(y)]
Lf
qL
(
Lk
Lf
1
maLf
+
dabL
dmaLf
  
b
jjL
(1  abf jL)
nbL
dbL
dmaLf
)
  FL;
where the terms daL=dm
a
Lf and d
ba
L =dm
a
Lf capture the e¤ect a change in m
a
Lf has on the
price di¤erential between local and foreign competitors in the home market. Similarly,
dabL =dm
a
Lf and d
b
L=dm
a
Lf capture the e¤ect a change in m
a
Lf has on the price di¤erential
between local and foreign competitors in the foreign market. As shown in Appendix B,
evaluating the rst order condition at a symmetric equilibrium where maLf = m
a
L yields
qL
Lk
maLFL = N
aEa[aL(y)]

~naL   1
(~naL)
2   ~naL + 1
 
1 + sa(maL;m
b
L)

(40)
+N bEb[bL(y)]
"
~nabL   1 
~nabL
2   ~nabL + 1
# 
1 + sab(maL;m
b
L)

where ~naL = n
a
L + 
anbL and ~n
ab
L = n
a
L + 
abnbL; and
a = M baL exp
 
baL

and ab = M baL exp
 
bL

:
The (~naL; ~n
ab
L ) terms can be interpreted as the e¤ective competitors in the domestic and
foreign market; they reect trade costs and di¤erences in number of brands among domestic
and foreign rms. The sa(maL;m
b
L) and s
ab(maL;m
b
L) terms are dened in (B.16) and (B.17),
they reect direct relative price e¤ects arising from foreign competition (see more below).
In the extreme setting of high trade costs: ~naL = n
a
L (
a ! 0 and the probability of
selling domestically, af ; equals 1=n
a
L) and ~n
ab
L ! 1 (ab ! 1 and abf ! 0, as if the
e¤ective competitors from the foreign market are too large). In the other extreme setting
of zero trade costs, when maL = m
b
L : ~n
a
L = ~n
ab
L = n
a
L + n
b
L (
a ! 1; ab ! 1 and the
probability of selling domestically or abroad is equal 1=(naL + n
b
L)): In this case countries a
and b can be seen to be one big country. In both cases the terms (sa; sab) in (40) vanish; in
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Figure 4: sa(maL;m
b
L) as a function of 
a  (mbL
maL
)
Lk
Lf exp
 
baL

the high trade cost setting we are back in the autarky setting while in the zero trade cost
setting with equality of number of brands we get a rst order condition similar to equation
(39). In general, though, we need to consider the impact of the terms (sa; sab):
The term sa(maL;m
b
L)measures a direct relative price e¤ect of the additional competition
faced by rm f in the home market brought about by foreign competitors via changes in
the product range; likewise sab(maL;m
b
L) measures a direct relative price e¤ect foreign rms
face from country a rms brought about by changes in the range of products. Depending
on their signs the impact on the revenue is strengthened (positive) or weakened (negative)
in the presence of foreign competition; it is inuenced by the share of foreign e¤ective
competitors (in addition to trade costs).
Figure 4 depicts the relationship between sa(maL;m
b
L) and 
a for various values of ~naL
and ~nabL : In most cases, the relationship is negative (unless m
a
L >> m
b
L): For su¢ ciently
large naL and n
b
L, the condition determining the sign of the terms (s
a; sab) can be reduced
to whether
 
a; ab

is larger (smaller) than one, rendering  negative (positive).
For positive but not prohibitively large transportation cost, 0 < sa(maL;m
b
L) < 1 and
sab(maL;m
b
L) < 0 so that marginal prots from an additional brand are larger in the home
market than the marginal prots attained in the foreign market, ceteris paribus.
The subgame of a foreign rm (assuming that all rms in b except rm f; have mbL  1
brands while rm f has mbLf brands, and all rms from country a have m
a
L  1 brands) is
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derived analogous to (40). Evaluating its rst order condition at a symmetric equilibrium
where mbLf = m
b
L yields
qL
Lk
mbLFL = N
bEb[bL(y)]
"
~nbL   1 
~nbL
2   ~nbL + 1
# 
1 + sb(maL;m
b
L)

(41)
+NaEa[aL(y)]
"
~nbaL   1 
~nbaL
2   ~nbaL + 1
# 
1 + sba(maL;m
b
L)

;
where ~nbL = n
b
L + 
bnaL and ~n
ba
L = n
b
L + 
banaL:
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At equilibrium prices,
Ea[aL(y)] (42)
= Ea
" 
(naL)
Lf (maL)
Lk +
 
Lv
a
Ln
b
L
Lf  mbLLkL(y; ~naL)
(naL)
Lf (maL)
Lk +
 
LvaLn
b
L
Lf  mbLLkL(y; ~naL) + (naH)Hf (maH)Hk H(y; naH)
#
with L = exp
  LqL=Lf and vaL = exp ~naL(~naL 1)   ~naL(~naL a)
and
Eb[bL(y)] (43)
= Eb
"  
Lv
b
Ln
a
L
Lf (maL)Lk +  nbLLf  mbLLkL(y; ~naL) 
LvbLn
a
L
Lf (maL)Lk +  nbLLf  mbLLkL(y; ~naL) + (HnaH)Hf (maH)Hk H(y; naH)
#
with H = exp
  HqH=Hf and vbL = exp ~nbL(~nbL 1)   ~nbL(~nbL b) :
These expectations resemble equation (21) obtained in autarky with i(y; ni) dened as
before (see (22)). The term i; i = H;L, accounts for trade costs di¤erentials between the
two countries. When i is close to one (zero), trade costs associated with quality qi are
small (high) which will increase (decrease) the aggregate demand for its export. In the
extreme setting of prohibitive trade costs: i = 0 for i = L;H and Ea [aL(y)] is equal to
the autarky solution and Eb[bL(y)] = 1 as b only produces L and H is not traded.
While consumers in country a will face the transport cost for the imported low-quality
commodity only, consumers from country b face transport cost associated with both the
high-quality and the low-quality commodity. The s therefore discount the demands for
di¤erent quality goods for the associated di¤erences in trade costs.
The equations (39), (40) and (41) provide a system of equations that determine (maL;
mbL;mH) in the symmetric equilibrium given the number of rms.
26In Appendix B, b, ba; sb(maL;m
b
L) and s
ba(maL;m
b
L) are dened explicitly.
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4.1.1 Short-run open economy equilibrium
We now analyze how changes in trade cost a¤ect the range of brands per rm, holding
the number of rms constant. To do this we recognize that using the total di¤erential of
equations (39), (40) and (41), we can characterize this by three individual e¤ects: (i) the
selection e¤ect associated with the direct impact on Ea[ai (y)] and E
b[bi(y)] i = H;L; (ii)
the competition e¤ect associated with the impact on the e¤ective number of competitors
[~naL; ~n
ba
L ; ~n
b
L; ~n
ba
L ] and (iii) the direct relative price e¤ect associated with the impact on the 
sa; sab; sb; sba

terms. Since these three e¤ects are not unidirectional, the net e¤ect on the
range of products of either quality turns out to be ambiguous and depend on their relative
strengths.27
The analysis, details of which can be found in Appendix B, is notationally quite de-
manding. We have introduced the following notation: related to the selection e¤ect, e.g.,
maLaL and mbLaL measure the e¤ect of a change inm
a
L andm
b
L, respectively, on 
a
L;
28 related
to the competition e¤ect we have
haL 
24!aaL waL(~naL   1) (~n
a
L)
2 (~naL   2)
(~naL)
2   ~naL + 1
 + !abL wabL ~nabL   1
 
~nabL
2
(~nabL   2)h 
~nabL
2   ~nabL + 1i
35 > 0
hbL 
24!bbL wbL ~nbL   1
 
~nbL
2
(~nbL   2)h 
~nbL
2   ~nbL + 1i + !baL
wbaL 
~nbaL   1
  ~nbaL 2 (~nbaL   2)h 
~nbaL
2   ~nbaL + 1i
35 > 0;
and related to the direct price e¤ect we have
eaL 

!aaL
sa
(1 + sa)
"sa + !
ab
L
sab
(1 + sab)
"sab

ebL 

!bbL
sb
(1 + sb)
"sb + !
ba
L
sba
(1 + sba)
"sba

:
The haL (h
b
L) terms measure the impact changes in the relative number of brands (m
a
L;m
b
L)
have through changes in the appropriately weighted e¤ective competitiveness in the domestic-
and foreign market, ~naL and ~n
ab
L (~n
b
L and ~n
ba
L ), respectively .
29 The eaL (e
b
L) terms similarly
27Note, we start from the premises that a symmetric equilibrium for the product range game exists
without providing a proof. In order to keep the comparative-statics analysis tractable we take into account
the direct e¤ect of changes in  i for i = H;L but ignore second round e¤ects on ~naL and ~n
b
L implying that
bL (
a
L ) and 
ba
L (
ab
L ) are constant.
28The  parameters are dened in Appendix B, see equations (B.19) and (B.20).
29The weights !aaL = 1 !abL and !baL = 1 !bbL are dened in (B.21) and (B.22) and denote the share of
domestic (foreign) marginal prots in hands of rms from country a; and waL and w
b
L are dened in (B.15)
and (B.18) denoting the share of e¤ective foreign (home) brands in the home (foreign) market.
29
measure the impact changes in the relative number of brands (maL;m
b
L) have through a
change in relative prices of domestic and foreign competitors sa and sab (sb and sba); respec-
tively; "sa denotes the 
a elasticity of saL(m
a
L;m
b
L) and "sab the 
ab elasticity of sabL (m
a
L;m
b
L):
The signs of haL and h
b
L are unambiguously positive. The signs of e
a
L and e
b
L are am-
biguous, though, as the elasticities are negative for a large range of (maL;m
b
L) combinations
as reected by the s (as suggested by Figure 4) and 0 < sa < 1; 0 < sb < 1; sab < 0; and
sba < 0.
In the discussion of the short term impacts, it will be important to decide whether we
think that the price e¤ect (if positive) can outweigh the competition e¤ect, as these terms
appear as haL  eaL and hbL  ebL; and how their joint impact compares to the selection e¤ect.
We concentrate here on a discussion of the e¤ect of a reduction in transportation cost
of high-quality goods, H ; or equivalently an increase in H : In Appendix B, we derive the
following short-run impacts: for the high quality brand we have
m^aH
^H
=
HbL
DIS
8>>><>>>:
!bH
bL
bH
h
1  !aaL maLaL   !baL mbLaL
i
+ !aH
aL
aH
h
!abL maLaL + !
bb
L mbLaL
i
   hbL   ebL LkLf h!bH bLbH h1  !aaL maLaL + mbLaLi+ !aH aLaH!abL maLaL + mbLaLi
  (haL   eaL) LkLf
h
!bH
bL
bH
h
1  !baL

maLaL + mbLaL
i
+ !aH
aL
aH
!bbL

maLaL + mbLaL
i
9>>>=>>>; ;
(44)
where DIS > 0; and !aH (= 1   !bH) denotes the fraction of consumers from country a
who buy high-quality goods; for the low quality brand in country a and b; respectively, we
calculate
m^aL
^H
=  HbL
DIS
8>>><>>>:
!bH
bL
bH
!aLL + (1  !aHH)!abL + mbLaL
 
!aaL   !baL
 h
!bH
bHL
bH
+ !aH
aHL
aH
+ (1  !aHH)
i
   hbL   ebL LkLf h!aLL!bH bLbH + (1  !aHH)!abL i
  (haL   eaL) LkLf
h
!bLL!
b
H
bL
bH
+ (1  !aHH)!bbL
i
9>>>=>>>;
(45)
m^bL
^H
=  HbL
DIS
8>>><>>>:
!bH
bL
bH
!bLL + (1  !aHH)!bbL + maLaL
 
!baL   !aaL
 h
!bH
bHL
bH
+ !aH
aHL
aH
+ (1  !aHH)
i
   hbL   ebL LkLf h!aLL!bH bLbH + (1  !aHH)!abL i
  (haL   eaL) LkLf
h
!bLL!
b
H
bL
bH
+ (1  !aHH)!bbL
i
9>>>=>>>; ;
(46)
where !aHH ; !
a
LL; and !
b
LL are suitable weights (see Appendix). The rst line of each impact
reects the selection e¤ect, while the second and third line relate to the competition and
relative price e¤ects.
Starting from an initial short-run equilibrium, lower trade costs of high-quality goods
reduce the price of those goods relative to low-quality goods for consumers in country b. As
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a consequence, the likelihood that a high quality good is chosen in country b is increasing
(HbL > 0), thereby raising the protability of high-quality products, ceteris paribus. This
higher protability of high-quality goods in the export market is an incentive for producers
of high quality goods to increase their range of high-quality brands on o¤er (the selection
e¤ect is positive on m^aH). In addition, low-quality goodsproducing rms in both countries
are forced to prune their product lines, i.e., bmaL < 0 and bmbL < 0 (the selection e¤ect is
negative on m^aL and m^
b
L). The last term of the selection e¤ect on m^
a
L and m^
b
L; related to the
market share di¤erence (!aaL versus !
ba
L ); assigns a stronger selection e¤ect on the product
line in the market that has the larger share - overall we expect these components of the
selection e¤ect to be of secondary importance.
Associated with the pruning of product lines of low-quality goods and expanding prod-
uct lines of high-quality goods (due to the selection e¤ect) comes a change in competitive-
ness and relative prices. Holding the number of rms constant, the smaller range of low-
quality products available reduces the degree of competition among low-quality producers
in country a and b thereby increasing the protability which has the e¤ect of augmenting
the range of low-quality goods (the competition e¤ect is positive on m^aL and m^
b
L). The
competition e¤ect has the opposite impact on the range of high-quality goods, m^H (the
competition e¤ect is negative on m^aH). The competition e¤ects are the suitably weighted
haL and h
b
L terms in the second and third lines of (44)(46) (the terms in squared brackets
are positive). Finally, to the extend that the number of low-quality brands in country a
and b are impacted di¤erently, there is a direct relative price e¤ect associated with the
reduced trade cost arising from this additional competition. This e¤ect enters in the same
way as the competition e¤ect (the suitably weighted eaL and e
b
L terms). While the direct rel-
ative price e¤ect is ambiguous, we expect it to be dominated by the rst order competition
e¤ect.30
The impact of a reduction in transportation cost of low-quality goods, L; or equivalently
an increase in L is even more complex. In Appendix B, we show that it can be written
as a suitably weighted sum of the e¤ect of changes in income of country a and b plus an
additional competition and direct price e¤ect brought about by L. In view of the added
complexity, together with the intractability of the long-run equilibrium, we now consider
the complete specialization in quality setting.
30In Appendix B, it is shown that the impact of an increase of income in country b can be easily obtained
as by proportionality ybbLdy
b =  HbL ^H : Similar relations are obtained for an increase of income in
country a:
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4.2 Trade with complete specialization
Here we assume that the rich country, country a; produces the high quality goods while
the poor country, country b; only produces the low-quality good. This simplication allows
us to analyze the short-run and the long-run behavior and to look at the distributional
aspects of lower trade cost, which was not possible in the previous section. When a rm
exports a unit of output it again has to pay  i > 0 units of transportation, i = H;L.
We consider only the decision problem of a rm from a; where i = H. The mark-ups
of rm f and the remaining (ni   1) competitors in the domestic market are 
paif   ci

=
if
qi
1
(1  af ji)
(47)
 
paij   ci

=
if
qi
1
(1  ajji)
j = 1; ::; ni j 6= f (48)
while in the foreign market their mark-ups are 
pabif   ci    i

=
if
qi
1
(1  af ji)
(49)
 
pabij   ci    i

=
if
qi
1
(1  ajji)
j = 1; ::; ni j 6= f: (50)
In comparison to (38), note that ajji = 
ab
jji as there are no foreign competitors.
4.2.1 Short-run open economy equilibrium
The rst order condition evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium with mif = mi yields
ik
qi
 
NaEa[ai (y)] +N
bEb[bi(y)]
  ni   1
n2i   ni + 1

= miFi: (51)
This equation implicitly determines the optimal number of brands per rm with i = H
for country a: A similar analysis for rms from country b provides, implicitly, the optimal
number of brands per rm with i = L.
At a symmetric equilibrium, where rms produce the same range of brands and charge
the same price for each brand, aggregate demand by domestic and foreign households for
a typical brand of quality qH produced in a is, respectively,
daHf =
Na
mHnH
Ea[aH(y)] and d
ab
Hf =
N b
mHnH
Eb[bH(y)]:
By symmetry, aggregate demand from domestic and foreign households for a typical brand
of quality qL produced in b is, respectively,
dbLf =
N b
mLnL
Eb[bL(y)] and d
ba
Lf =
Na
mLnL
Ea[aL(y)]:
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The conditional probabilities (42) and (43) simplify to
Ea[aH(y)] = E
a

n
Hf
H (mH)
HkH(y; nH)
[(nH)
Hf (mH)HkH(y; nH)] + [(LnL)
Lf (mL)LkL(y; nL)]

Eb[bH(y)] = E
b

(nHH)
Hf (mH)
HkH(y; nH)
[(HnH)
Hf (mH)HkH(y; nH)] + [(nL)
Lf (mL)LkL(y; nL)]

;
with i and i for i = H;L, dened as above.
Evaluating (51) at the short-run equilibrium, shows that a fall in trade cost (both for
high and low quality goods) increases the protability of rms whose products belong to
that quality class and consequently provides an incentive to increase unambiguously their
range of brands, while rms producing the other product quality prune their range of
products:
bmLbH =   1DS Hf!bL
b
HL
bL
< 0 (52)
bmHbH = 1DS Hf!bH 
b
HL
bH
> 0; (53)
with DS > 0 and !bi denotes the fraction of consumers from country b who buy goods of
quality qi, i = H;L, and bHL  Eb(bH(y)bL(y)) and bH  Eb(bH(y)):
4.2.2 Long-run open economy equilibrium
In the long-run the number of rms producing in each industry is determined by the free
entry zero-prot condition. In this case the prot functions are given by
i(nH ; nL) =
1
qi
 
NaE[ai (y)] +N
bE[bi(y)]
 "(if   ik) (ni   1)2 + ifni
(ni   1) (n2i   ni + 1)
#
 Ki;
for i = H;L and as long as prots are positive (negative) rms will enter (exit ) the market.
Market clearing for each brand requires
nHmHxH = N
aEa[aH(y)] +N
bEb[bH(y)]
nLmLxL = N
aEa[aL(y)] +N
bEb[bL(y)];
where mixi is the break-even output of a rm producing quality qi as given by (29) and ni
is the equilibrium number of rms active in di¤erentiated industry qi. The long-run open
economy equilibrium is stable and unique under conditions analogous to those derived for
the closed economy, see Appendix B for details. We can now readily analyze the e¤ects of
lower transportation cost on the number of rms, its product range and prices.
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A reduction in the transportation cost of low-quality products (associated with an
increase in L) leads to a larger number of rms producing brands of quality qL and a
smaller number of rms producing brands of quality qH :bnLbL = 1eDS'HDSLf!aL
a
HL
aL
> 0
bnHbL =   1eDS'LDSHf!aH 
b
HL
bL
< 0;
with eDS > 0 and 'i  1; capturing the e¤ect of rm entry on net total prots, dened as
in (A.18). The number of brands of quality qL (qH) changes proportional to the number of
rms nL (nH) according to
bmLbL =

'L   n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
 bnLbL > 0bmHbL =  

'H   n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
 bnHbL < 0;
for ni > 2; i = H;L. Analogous to the autarky case, the relative change inmi in comparison
to the relative change in ni depends on initial number of rms active in the market (see
Proposition 2).
The price of low quality goods falls in both countries but more so in the importing
country a than country b due to the direct e¤ect of the transport cost. The price of high-
quality goods increases in both countries. A reduction in the trade cost of high quality
goods leads to analogous results: the number of rms and the number of products per rm
decreases for low quality and expands in the high quality sector.
4.2.3 Welfare
We next turn to the welfare implications associated with the long run impact of lower trade
costs. To this end, consider respectively the expected welfare of a household with income
y from country a and country b:
va(y)  nHfH mHkH H(y; nH)+ [(LnL)LfmLkL L(y; nL)]
vb(y)  [(HnH)HfmHkH H(y; nH)] +

n
Lf
L m
Lk
L L(y; nL)

:
Di¤erentiating va(y) and vb(y) yields expressions that decompose the change in expected
welfare of a household with income y into a cost-savings e¤ect and a composition e¤ect
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(similar to Fajgelbaum et al., 2011). For a household from country a we obtain
v^a(y) = Lf
a
L(y)
bL (54)
+LH
8<:
h
aH(y)
H
Hf
'H

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  aL(y)
L
Lf
'L

1 + nL
(nL 1)2
i
+
h
aH(y)
H
Hk
'H
('H   H)  
a
L(y)
L
Lk
'L
('L   L)
i 9=; ('HbnH   'LbnL) ;
where i =
Na
Na+Nb
ai +
Nb
Na+Nb
bi ; i = H;L, is a population weighted fraction of consumers
from both countries that consume a brand of quality qi; ai (y) denotes the fraction of
consumers from country a that purchase a brand of quality qi: Similarly, for a household
from country b we get
v^b(y) = Hf
b
H(y)
bH (55)
+LH
8<:
h
bH(y)
H
Hf
'H

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  bL(y)
L
Lf
'L

1 + nL
(nL 1)2
i
+
h
bH(y)
H
Hk
'H
('H   H)  
b
L(y)
L
Lk
'L
('L   L)
i 9=; ('HbnH   'LbnL) ;
with bi(y) denoting the fraction of consumers from country b that purchase a brand of
quality qi: The rst line in each expression represents the cost-savings e¤ect while the
second line represents the composition e¤ect. The latter is similar to the one discussed in
relation to the welfare implications under autarky, see (31).
A decrease in the trade cost of low-quality goods reduces the cost of imports and hence
is benecial to all consumers in country a, irrespective of their income level, while leaving
the consumers in country b una¤ected. Holding constant the relative number of brands and
rms, lower cost of trading low-quality goods raises the protability of low-quality products
leading to an increase in the number of rms and brands in country b. The composition
e¤ect captures the associated welfare impact emanating from changes in the relative number
of rms and brands of di¤erent qualities. Analogous to the autarky setting, the composition
e¤ect impacts households di¤erently depending on their income and will favour the poor
households in both countries more than the rich households given ('HbnH   'LbnL) < 0:
The discussion of a reduction in the trade cost of high-quality goods is analogous: it is
benecial to all consumers in country b because of the reduced cost of imports, while the
associated composition e¤ect will favour the rich households in both countries more than
the poor ones given ('HbnH   'LbnL) > 0:
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have developed a general equilibrium model in the presence of vertical
product di¤erentiation (product quality) and non-homothetic preferences. We assume that
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the market structure in the di¤erentiated goods sector is oligopolistic. The associated
strategic interaction between rms producing brands of the same quality render both the
number of rms and the number of brands per rm in equilibrium responsive to changes
in the income distribution in the presence of non-homothetic preferences. These income
distributional e¤ects with empirical evidence to support them have been neglected in
the literature of multiproduct rms due to the reliance on the assumption that preferences
are (quasi)-homothetic. We derive conditions under which a general equilibrium exists and
is stable with both types of rms producing more than one brand and extend the framework
to two countries where trade in di¤erentiated goods is subject to trading costs.
Our results are revealing compared to those in the literature (either in the absence of
multi-products or with multi-product rms producing under monopolistic competition).
In particular, in autarky we show how income changes (and changes in the size of the
economy) impact the number of rms and number of brands per rm for each quality
di¤erently. Two opposing e¤ects are operative: a quality selection and a competition e¤ect
with their relative magnitude depending on the initial number of rms active in the market.
Our model predicts that (i) a larger country sustains a larger number of rms that produce
a larger product range at a smaller scale and lower prices for each quality; and (ii) a richer
country (rst order stochastic dominance) supports a larger number of higher-quality goods,
each producing a larger number of variants at a smaller scale with lower prices. Also, in the
open economy setting under incomplete specialization an additional e¤ect is operative: the
relative price e¤ect. It accounts for the fact that the number of brands in both countries
are a¤ected di¤erently which impacts the competitiveness. Under complete specialization
this relative price e¤ect is absent and lower trade costs for a particular di¤erentiated good
unambiguously increases the number of rms and brands of that di¤erentiated product.
Depending on the initial number of rms either the rm expansion- or the product line
expansion e¤ect dominates.
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A Closed Economy
A.1 Comparative Statics: Short-run equilibrium
We start by total di¤erentiation of the short-run equilibrium conditions (19) for i = H;L.
Di¤erentiation of the expectation term on the lhs, E(i(y)); yields for i = L :
d(EL(y))
= Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

HLbnL + LkHL bmL   Hf 1 + nH(nH 1)2 HLbnH
 HkHL bmH + HL [qL   qH ] dy;
where we dene HL(= LH)  E(L(y)H(y)).31 From Jensens inequality it follows that
E(H(y)L(y))  E(H(y))E(L(y)) or HL  HL; furthermore HL  H and HL  L
(because 0  i(y)  1): Expressed in relative changes, E(dL(y))=L; we have
bL = HLL fLf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2
 bnL + Lkm^L   Hf 1 + nH(nH 1)2 bnH (A.1)
 Hk bmH + [qL   qH ] dyg:
Similarly
bH = HLH fHf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2
 bnH + Hk bmH   Lf 1 + nL(nL 1)2 bnL (A.2)
 Lk bmL   [qL   qH ] gdy:
After substituting the two previous equations into the total di¤erential of (19) for i = H;L,
we obtain, in matrix notation
"
aL1 aL2
aH1 aH2
#" bmLbmH
#
=
"
aL3 aL4  aL5 Ly
aH3  aH4 aH5 Hy
#266664
bNbnLbnH
dy
377775 (A.3)
with
aL1 =
h
1  Lk HLL
i
aH1 = Lk
HL
H
aL2 = Hk
HL
L
aH2 =
h
1  Hk HLH
i
aL3 = 1 aH3 = 1
aL4 = Lf
HL
L
h
1 + nL
(nL 1)2
i
  n2L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
aH4 = Lf
HL
H
h
1 + nL
(nL 1)2
i
aL5 = Hf
HL
L
h
1 + nH
(nH 1)2
i
aH5 = Hf
HL
H
h
1 + nH
(nH 1)2
i
  n2H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
Ly =
HL
L
[qL   qH ] Hy =  HLH [qL   qH ] :
31The order of integration and di¤erentation can be exchanged.
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Solving for the relative change in mL and mH gives
" bmLbmH
#
=
1
D1
"
aH2  aL2
 aH1 aL1
#"
aL3 aL4  aL5 Ly
aH3  aH4 aH5 Hy
#266664
bNbnLbnH
dy
377775 : (A.4)
The sign of the determinant D1 is unambiguously positive:
D1 = 1  Lk
HL
L
  Hk
HL
H
> 0:
This follows as we can decompose D1 as
(1  Hk) (1  Lk) + (1  Hk)Lk

1  HL
H

+ (1  Lk)Hk

1  HL
L

+HkLk

1  HL
H

1  HL
L

  HLHL
LH

;
where 
1  HL
H

1  HL
L

  HLHL
LH

=

1  HL
LH

> 0:
A.1.1 Figure 2
The two short-run equilibrium conditions can be written as
E[L(y)]
mi
(nL   1)
(n2L   nL + 1)
Lk
qi
=
FL
N
(A.5)
E[H(y)]
mH
(nH   1)
(n2H   nH + 1)
Hk
qH
=
FH
N
: (A.6)
Analog to Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), they are depicted in Figure 2 as mLL and mHH ,
respectively. They show combinations of number of brands o¤ered by a high-quality pro-
ducing rm and a low-quality producing rm satisfying the rst order conditions for prot
maximization, given the number of rms. We can determine uniqueness of mL and mH by
considering various limits. Consider (A.5): ifmH ! 0; mL = LkqL NFL
(nL 1)
(n2L nL+1)
; asmH !1;
mL ! 0: Similarly for (A.6): as mL ! 0; mH = HkqH NFH
(nH 1)
(n2H nH+1)
; as mL !1; mH ! 0:
A.1.2 Change in population size N
From (A.4) we obtain bmHbN = 1D1

1  Lk
HL
HL

> 0 (A.7)
bmLbN = 1D1

1  Hk
HL
HL

> 0 (A.8)
with D1 = 1  Lk HLL   Hk
HL
H
:
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A.1.3 Change in the income distribution
First order stochastic dominance To evaluate the e¤ect of an increase in income on
the short-run equilibrium, we consider the e¤ect of changing the cumulative distribution
of income, FY (y); to one that stochastically dominates the initial distribution of income.
From (A.4), the increase in income, will cause bmH to increase and bmL to decrease asbmH
dy
=   1
D1
HL
H
[qL   qH ] > 0 (A.9)bmL
dy
=
1
D1
HL
L
[qL   qH ] < 0: (A.10)
Mean-preserving spread Similar to Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), a mean-preserving
spread in Fy(y); ceteris paribus, leads to an increase in mH and a fall in mL; when for
all y, L(y) > H(y): This statement relies on the fact that this condition ensures that
H(y) is a convex increasing function of income; that is @H(y;mH ;mL)=@y  0H(y) =
H(y) (qH   qa(y)) and @2H(y;mH ;mL)=@2y = (1   2H(y))0H(y) (qH   qL) > 0:32 The
mean preserving spread will then cause E[H(y;mH ;mL)] to increase holding mH and mL
constant (Gravelle and Rees, 2004). For the two short-order equilibrium conditions to re-
main satised, mL and mH need to respond. Intuitively, the increase in E[H(y;mH ;mL)]
will need to be compensated to ensure E[H(y)]=mH remains constant. An obvious solution
for given mL is to increase mH ; whereas this would further increase E[H(y)] (since the
partial derivative of H with respect to mH is positive) it cannot dominate the direct e¤ect
increasing mH has on the ratio E[H(y)]=mH); equally given mH an increase in mL would
establish this compensation. The mean preserving spread therefore moves the mHH curve
towards the right. The reverse holds true for the mLL curve, which shifts towards the left,
yielding the overall e¤ect of an increase in mH and fall in mL (see Figure 2).
In order to quantify the optimal responses to the mean preserving spread let f(y; )
denote the probability density function of income, i.e., dFy(y; )=dy, with  parameterizing
this mean preserving spread (see also Gravelle and Rees, 2004). Furthermore, let 0H;mH
and 0HmL denote the partial derivatives of H = E[H(y)] with respect to mH and mL
0H;mH =
HkHL
mH
> 0
0H;mL =  
LkHL
mH
< 0
and
 i =
qi
ik
n2i   ni + 1
ni   1
Fi
N
; i = H;L: (A.11)
32By symmetry L(y) is a concave decreasing function of income.
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As argued before, the mean preserving spread is associated with an increase in E[H(y;
mH ;mL)]; or Z 1
ymin
H(y;mH ;mL)f(y; )dy > 0; (A.12)
where f(y; ) is the shift in the probability density function as  varies. We denote
the optimal responses mH() and m

L() which for notional convenience we call m
. The
optimal responses to the mean preserving spread are described by the total di¤erentiation
of (A.6), simplied here as H =  HmH ;Z 1
ymin
H(y;m
)f(y; )dy +
 
0H;mH (m
)   H
 dmH
d
+ 0H;mL(m
)
dmL
d
= 0
and the requirement that both short-run equilibrium conditions are satised. This ensures
that dmL
d
=dmH
d
=   H= L:33 Then
dmH
d

 0H;mH (m) +  H +
 H
 L
0H;mL(m
)

=
dH
d
:
We therefore have
dmH
d
=

 H  
HkHL(m
)
mH
   H
 L
LkHL(m
)
mH
 1
dH
d
=
mH
H(m
)

1  Hk
HL(m
)
H(m
)
  Lk
HL(m
)
L(m
)
)
 1
dH
d
> 0 (A.13)
dmL
d
=   m

L
L(m
)

1  Hk
HL(m
)
H(m
)
  Lk
HL(m
)
L(m
)
)
 1
dH
d
< 0; (A.14)
where the inequalities follow since the term in square brackets equals D1 which is positive:
A.1.4 Change in number of rms
For the cross e¤ect we obtain from (A.4) an unambiguous negative e¤ect for nL > 1.
Specically
bmHbnL =   1D1 HLH
n
Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

  Lk n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
o
=   1
D1
HL
H
b2nL < 0:
The terms in parenthesis can be written asn
Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2  
n2L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)

+
 
Lf   Lk
 n2L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
o
;
and both components are positive with Lf   Lk > 0; rendering the total e¤ect negative.
33If we sum the two short-run equilibrium conditions, E(H(y)) =  HmH and E(L(y)) =  LmL; we
have 1 =  HmH +  LmL from which this statement directly follows.
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The own e¤ect is related asbmLbnL = 1D1

Lf
HL
L

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

 

1  Hk
HL
H

n2L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)

=  H
L
bmHbnL   n2L(nL 2)(n2L nL+1)(nL 1) :
Clearly
L
bmLbnL + H bmHbnL =  L n2L(nL 2)(n2L nL+1)(nL 1) < 0:
The own e¤ect can be positive, but not too strong (the sum of the probability weighted
own and cross e¤ect remains negative).
The results are symmetric for bmLbnH and bmHbnH :bmLbnH =   1D1 HLL
n
Hf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  Hk n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
o
< 0;
bmHbnH =   LH bmHbnH   n2H(nH 2)(n2H nH+1)(nH 1) :
A.2 Comparative Statics: Long-run autarky equilibrium
We solve the long-run equilibrium by substituting (A.4) into (A.1) and (A.2), which allows
us to express the relative change bi in terms of the relative change N^ , n^H ; n^L; and in terms
of dy:
bH =  HLH 1D1f [Lk   Hk] bN + (qL   qH) dy (A.15)
+
h
Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

  Lk n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
i bnL
 
h
Hf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  Hk n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
i bnHg
bL = HLL 1D1f [Lk   Hk] bN + [qL   qH ] dy (A.16)
+
h
Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

  Lk n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
i bnL
 
h
Hf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  Hk n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
i bnHg:
A.2.1 Stability and uniqueness of the long-run autarky equilibrium
Assume that rms are short-sighted: they enter when prots are positive and exit otherwise,
with prots given by
i(nH ; nL) =
N
qi
E[i(y)]
(
(if   ik) (ni   1)2 + ifni
(ni   1) (n2i   ni + 1)
)
 Ki for i = H;L: (A.17)
43
The ow of rms into each industry can be described by two di¤erential equations of the
following form

ni = nii(nH ; nL):
In the steady state,

ni = 0 and nH > 0 and nL > 0 as H(nH ; nL) = L(nH ; nL) = 0:
To nd conditions for a locally stable equilibrium consider the Jacobian matrix evaluated
around the steady state:
J =
"
nLLnL nLLnH
nHHnL nHHnH
#
(subscripts refers to the derivative with respect to nH and nL):
Consider, e.g.,
LnL =
@
h
N
qL
L
n
(Lf Lk)(nL 1)2+LfnL
(nL 1)(n2L nL+1)
o
 KL
i
@nL
=
N
qL
n
(Lf Lk)(nL 1)2+LfnL
(nL 1)(n2L nL+1)
o @L
@nL
+
N
qL
L
@
n
(Lf Lk)(nL 1)2+LfnL
(nL 1)(n2L nL+1)
o
@nL
:
The rst term represents the selection e¤ect on prots and the second term the competition
e¤ect. We denote
@
(
(Lf Lk)(nL 1)2+LfnL
(nL 1)(n2L nL+1)
)
@nL
=   (Lf Lk)(nL 1)
2+LfnL
(nL 1)(n2L nL+1)
'L=nL; with
'i =
n2i (ni   1)
(ni   1) (n2i   ni + 1)
+
ifni(n
3
i+1)
[(if ik)(ni 1)2+ifni](ni 1)(n2i ni+1)
(A.18)
 1;
i = H;L:34 Using (A.16), we obtain
LnL =  
KL
nLD1

'LD1  
HL
L
h
Lf

1 + nL
(nHL 1)2

  Lk n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
i
:
Similarly,
LnH =
@
h
N
qL
L
n
(Lf Lk)(nL 1)2+LfnL
(nL 1)(n2L nL+1)
o
 KL
i
@nH
=   KL
nHD1

HL
L
h
Lf

1 + nL
(nHL 1)2

  Lk n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
i
:
There is no competition e¤ect across quality groups. Using (A.15) for the remaining terms,
we obtain
J =   1
D1
"
KLb1nL KL
nL
nH
b1nH
KH
nH
nL
b2nL KHb2nH
#
34Note, 'i approaches asymptotically one as ni !1.
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with
b1nL  'LD1  
H
L
b2nL
b1nH  HL
L
h
Hf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  Hk n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
i
> 0
b2nL  HL
H
h
Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

  Lk n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
i
> 0
b2nH  'HD1  
L
H
b1nH ;
for i = H;L: Here D1 =
h
1  Lk HLL   Hk
HL
H
i
as before.
The long-run autarky equilibrium is locally stable if the trace of the Jacobian matrix is
negative and its determinant is positive. For the trace we obtain
tr (J) =   1
D1
[KLb1nL +KHb2nH ]
=  KH
D1
n
'HD1   HLH
h
Hf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  Hk n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
io
 KL
D1
n
'LD1   HLL
h
Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

  Lk n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
io
;
which is negative if
'iD1 >
HL
i
h
if

1 + ni
(ni 1)2

  ik n
2
i (ni 2)
(n2i ni+1)(ni 1)
i
; (A.19)
i = H;L; so that b1nL > 0 and b2nH > 0; ensuring that the competition e¤ect dominates
the selection e¤ect. The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is positive if
det(J) = nHnL (HnHLnL   HnLLnH )
=
KHKL
D1

'L'HD1   'L
L
H
b1nH   'H
H
L
b2nL

> 0: (A.20)
This is true when the e¤ect of a change in ni on the operating prots of a rm from the
same sector i dominates the e¤ect on the operating prots from a change in the number of
rms from the other sector, nj, for i = j = H;L, and i 6= j.
Given the stability and the uniqueness of the long-run autarky equilibrium, we are now
in the position to conduct a comparative static analysis. Using (A.15) and (A.16), total
di¤erentiation of (A.17) evaluated in the steady state yields"
b1nL b1nH
b2nL b2nH
#" bnLbnH
#
=
"
1  Hk HLLH
HL
L
1  Lk HLLH  
HL
H
#" bN
(qL   qH) dy
#
:
By inversion, we obtain" bnLbnH
#
=
1
D2
"
b2nH  b1nH
 b2nL b1nL
#"
1  Hk HLLH
HL
L
1  Lk HLLH  
HL
H
#" bN
(qL   qH) dy
#
: (A.21)
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From our discussion of the stability analysis, D2 > 0 or
D2
D1
= 'L'HD1   'L
L
H
b1nH   'H
H
L
b2nL > 0:
A.2.2 Change in population size N
From (A.21) we obtain,
bnLbN = D1D2

'H

1  Hk
HL
HL

  b1nH
H

> 0
bnHbN = D1D2

'L

1  Lk
HL
HL

  b2nL
L

> 0:
Considering bnL= bN; we note that the term in the curly brackets can be written as
'H

1  Lk
HL
HL
  Hk
HL
HL

  b1nH
H
+ 'HLk
HL
HL
:
Since 
1  Lk
HL
HL
  Hk
HL
HL

> D1;
in combination with 'LD1   HL b2nL > 0; it follows that bnL= bN > 0: An analogous result
follows for bnH= bN:
The compositional e¤ect associated with an increase in the size of the economy is given
by
'H
bnHbN   'LbnLbN
= D1
D2
HL
HL
'H'L
n
Hk
'H

'H   n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)

  Lk
'L

'L   n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)

+
h
Hf
'H

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  Lf
'L

1 + nL
(nL 1)2
io
:
Using (A.18), the e¤ect on the scope is
bmibN =

'i   n
2
i (ni 2)
(n2i ni+1)(ni 1)
 bnibN > 0
The e¤ect on the scale is : bxibN =  
n
(2ni 1)
(n2i ni+1)(ni 1)
o bnibN  0 (A.22)
since ni > 1; and the e¤ect on prices is:
dpibN =  ifqi ni(ni   1)2 bnibN < 0: (A.23)
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A.2.3 Change in the income distribution
First order stochastic dominance From (A.21) the increase in income on the number
of rms, is
bnL
dy
=
'HD1
D2
HL
L
[qL   qH ] < 0bnH
dy
=  'LD1
D2
HL
H
[qL   qH ] > 0:
The compositional e¤ect associated with this increase, 'H
bnH
dy
  'L bnLdy ; is unambiguously
positive. The increase will generate a shift in the composition of di¤erentiated goods
towards the high-quality goods.
The increase in income has similar e¤ects on the number of brands per rm
bmi
dy
=

'i   n
2
i (ni 2)
(n2i ni+1)(ni 1)
 bni
dy
;
the scale bxi
dy
=  
n
(2ni 1)
(n2i ni+1)(ni 1)
o bni
dy
and the prices
dpi
dy
=  if
qi
ni
(ni   1)2
bni
dy
:
Mean-preserving spread We again assume that L(y) > H(y) for all y, to ensure that
H(y) is a convex increasing function of income. The mean preserving spread will then
cause E[H(y;mH ;mL; nL; nL)] to increase holding mH ; mL; nH and nL constant. For the
long-run equilibrium to be re-established, mH ; mL; nH and nL need to respond. Let 0H;mH ;
0HmL ; 
0
H;nH
; 0HnL denote the partial derivatives of H = E[H(y)] with respect to these
variables given by
0H;mH =
HkHL
mH
> 0
0H;mL =  
LkHL
mL
< 0
0H;nH =
Hf
h
1 + nH
(nH 1)2
i
HL
nH
> 0
0H;nL =  
Lf
h
1 + nL
(nL 1)2
i
nL
HL < 0:
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Recall from Section (A.1.3) that f(y; ) denotes the probability density function of income
with  parameterizing the mean preserving spread. We use the simplifying notation:
 i =
qi
ik
Fi
N
n2i ni+1
ni 1
i = qi
Ki
N
(ni 1)(n2i ni+1)
[(if ik)(ni 1)2+ifni]
(A.24)
for i = H;L, with d i=dni =  i
ni(ni 2)
(ni 1)(n2i ni+1)
and di=dni = i'i=ni: where 'i is as before.
The optimal responses are denoted nm = fmH();mL(); nH(); nL()g : They are
described by the total di¤erentiation of the rst order conditions associated with optimal
scope, simplied here as E[H(y)] = mH H ; and the zero prot conditions, or E[H(y)] =
H :
35 R1
ymin
H(y;nm
)f(y; )dy + dmHd

0H;mH (nm
)   H

+ dmL
d
0H;mL(nm
)
+dnL
d
0H;nL(nm
) + dnH
d
h
0H;nH (nm
) mH H n

H(n

H 2)
(nH 1)(n2H  nH+1)
i
= 0
(A.25)
R1
ymin
H(y;nm
)f(y; )dy + dmHd 
0
H;mH
(nm) + dmL
d
0H;mL(nm
)
+dnL
d
0H;nL(nm
) + dnH
d
h
0H;nH (nm
)  H'H
nH
i
= 0
(A.26)
together with the requirement that the associated conditions with the decrease inE[L(y;mH ;mL)]
need to be satised as well. The latter ensures that36
 L
dmL
d
+  H
dmH
d
+mL 

L
nL(n

L 2)
(nL 1)(n2L  nL+1)
dnL
d
+
mH 

H
nH(n

H 2)
(nH 1)(n2H  nH+1)
dnH
d
= 0 (A.27)
dnL
d
=
dnH
d
=  

H'

H=n

H
L'

L=n

L
=  

H'

H=n

H
L'

L=n

L
< 0: (A.28)
Substracting (A.26) from (A.25), gives
dmH
d
=
dnH
d
=  

mH 

H
nH(n

H 2)
(nH 1)(n2H  nH+1)
  H'H 1nH

= H (A.29)
=
mH
nH

'H   n
2
H (n

H 2)
(nH 1)(n2H  nH+1)

> 0;
where the second equality uses mH 

H = 

H and the inequality follows from (A.18). Plug-
ging (A.28) and (A.29) into (A.27), gives
dmL
d
=
dnH
d
=  

H'

H=n

H
L'

L=n

L
mL
nL

'L   n
2
L (n

L 2)
(nL 1)(n2L  nL+1)

< 0: (A.30)
35Since  i and i depend on ni; we will use
 to denote their associate values.
36As before, the set of conditions associated with optimal scope also yield 1 = mH H+mL L; summing
the two zero-prot conditions, E(H(y)) = H and E(L(y)) = L; yields 1 = H+L: The statement then
follows.
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Substituting (A.28)(A.30) into (A.26), given for the number of rms
dnH
d
=

 

mH
nH

'H   n
2
H (n

H 2)
(nH 1)(n2H  nH+1)

0H;mH + 
0
H;nH

+
H'

H=n

H
L'

L=n

L

mL
nL

'L   n
2
L (n

L 2)
(nL 1)(n2L  nL+1)

0H;mL + 
0
H;nL

+
H'

H
nH
 1
dH
d
=

H'

H
nH
  HL

Hk
1
nH

'H   n
2
H (n

H 2)
(nH 1)(n2H  nH+1)

+ Hf
1
nH

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

 
H'

H=n

H
L'

L=n

L
HL

Lk
1
nL

'L   n
2
L (n

L 2)
(nL 1)(n2L  nL+1)

+ Lf
1
nL

1 + nL
(nL 1)2
 1 dH
d
=
'Ln

H
H

'L'

H   'L

Hk
HL
H
'H +
HL
H
n
Hf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  Hk n
2
H (n

H 2)
(nH 1)(n2H  nH+1)
o
 
'H

Lk
HL
L
'L +
HL
L
n
Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

  Lk n
2
L (n

L 2)
(nL 1)(n2L  nL+1)
o 1 dH
d
=
'Ln

H
H
D1
D2
dH
d
> 0
and
dnL
d
=  

H'

H=n

H
L'

L=n

L
'Ln

H
H
D1
D2
dH
d
=  '

H
'L
nL
L
D1
D2
dH
d
=
'Hn

L
L
D1
D2
dL
d
< 0;
where the inequalities follow as D2 > 0: For the number of brands, we obtain
dmH
d
= mH

'H   n
2
H (n

H 2)
(nH 1)(n2H  nH+1)
 'L
H
D1
D2
dH
d
> 0
dmL
d
=  mL

'L   n
2
L (n

L 2)
(nL 1)(n2L  nL+1)
 'H
L
D1
D2
dH
d
= mL

'L   n
2
L (n

L 2)
(nL 1)(n2L  nL+1)
 'H
L
D1
D2
dL
d
< 0:
A.3 Welfare
A.3.1 Welfare and second order stochastic dominance
Using McFadden (1978), we note that in our model the expected maximum utility of a
household with income y is
E(maxU(y)) = ln
 
n
Lf
L m
Lk
L exp ((y   pL) qL) + n
Hf
H m
Hk
H exp ((y   pH) qH)

: (A.31)
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Clearly the expected maximum utility is increasing with income as
@E(maxU(y))
@y
= L(y)qL + H(y)qH > 0
implying that the welfare of everyone increases with income. The expected marginal utility
of income is increasing as
@2E(maxU(y))
@2y
= 0L(y)qL + 
0
H(y)qH
= L (y) (qL   qa) qL + H (y) (qH   qa) qH
= L (y) (1  L (y))(qH   qL)2
> 0;
where qa = L(y)qL + H(y)qH :
A.3.2 Welfare expression
Here we derive the welfare expression given by equation (31) in the main text. Dene
ln (v(y)) = E(maxU(y)): Using (A.31), the e¤ect changes in fnH ; nL;mH ;mLg have on
expected welfare is then given by
v^(y) = H(y)
h
Hf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2
 bnH + Hk bmHi+ L(y) hLf 1 + nL(nL 1)2 bnL + Lk bmLi :
(A.32)
Since the relative changes in mi are proportional to the relative changes in ni, with factor
of proportionality ('i    i) ; with  i = n
2
i (ni 2)
(n2i ni+1)(ni 1)
; we can re-write (A.32) as
v^(y) = H(y)
h
Hf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

+ Hk('H   H)
i bnH
+L(y)
h
Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

+ Lk('L   L)
i bnL:
In our attempt to obtain the pure scale and composition e¤ect (similar to Fajgelbaum
et al. 2011), we rst note using (27) and (28) thatbN = H'HbnH + L'LbnL; (A.33)
with i = ximini=N = nimidif : Together they provide the relationship
v^(y) =
0@ H(y)H'H nHf 1 + nH(nH 1)2+ Hk('H   H)o
+L(y)
L'L
n
Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

+ Lk('L   L)
o 1A bN
+HL
0@ H(y)'HH nHf 1 + nH(nH 1)2+ Hk('H   H)o
 L(y)
'LL
n
Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

+ Lk('L   L)
o 1A ('HbnH   'LbnL)
which is given in the main text.
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B Open Economy
B.1 Incomplete specialization
B.1.1 Decision process of an H rm from country a
The rst order conditions for H rms selling respectively in country a and b are 
paHf   cH

=
Hf
qH
1
1  af jH
 (B.1)
 
paHj   cH

=
Hf
qH
Hf=qH
1  ajjH
 j = 1; ::; nH j 6= f; (B.2)
 
pabHf   cH   H

=
Hf
qH
1
1  af jH
 ; (B.3)
 
pabHf   cH   H

=
Hf
qH
1
1  ajjH
 j = 1; ::; nH j 6= f (B.4)
since abjjH = 
a
jjH : The rst two describe the pricing decision for the home market, the
last two for the foreign market. In comparison with the home market, transportation
costs increase the price of high-quality goods in the foreign market. Firms assume that
markets are segmented. As a result, we can apply the same arguments we applied in the
autarky case to prove that the price equilibrium is unique in both markets. The optimal
number of brands per rm is implicitly determined once the pricing strategies (B.1)-(B.4)
are substituted into the prot function and is given in the main text.
B.1.2 Decision process of an L rm from country a
Firms assume that markets are segregated: Taking aL and 
b
L as given, the rst order
conditions for rms selling in a are 
paLf   cL

=
Lf
qL
1
1  af jL

 
paLj   cL

=
Lf
qL
1
1  ajjL
 j = 1; ::; naL j 6= f;
 
pbaLj   cL   L

=
Lf
qL
1
1  baf jL
 j = 1; ::; nbL:
51
The conditional probabilities are given by
af jL =
MaL exp (
a
L)
(naL   1) +MaL exp (aL) + nbLM baL exp
 
baL

ajjL =
1
(naL   1) +MaL exp (aL) + nbLM baL exp
 
baL

bajjL =
M baL exp
 
baL

(naL   1) +MaL exp (aL) + nbLM baL exp
 
baL

where MaL = (
maLf
maL
)
Lk
Lf ; M baL = (
mbL
maL
)
Lk
Lf and
aL =
 
paL   paLf

qL=Lf and 
ba
L =
 
paL   pbaL

qL=Lf .
Note
af jL + (n
a
L   1)ajjL + nbLbajjL = 1:
By symmetry, for rms selling in b:
bjjL =
M baL exp
 
bL

(naL   1) +MaL exp
 
abL

+ nbLM
ba
L exp
 
bL

abf jL =
MaL exp
 
abL

(naL   1) +MaL exp
 
abL

+ nbLM
ba
L exp
 
bL

abjjL =
1
(naL   1) +MaL exp
 
abL

+ nbLM
ba
L exp
 
bL
 :
with
bL =
 
pabL   pbL

qL=Lf and 
ab
L =
 
pabL   pabLf

qL=Lf :
We obtain the following system of equations concerning the di¤erences in prices:
aL =
1
(naL 2)+MaL exp(aL)+nbLMbaL exp(baL )
  M
a
L exp(aL)
(naL 1)+nbLMbaL exp(baL )
(B.5)
baL =
1
(naL 2)+MaL exp(aL)+nbLMbaL exp(baL )
  M
ba
L exp(baL )
(naL 1)+MaL exp(aL)+(nbL 1)MbaL exp(baL )
  LqL
Lf
(B.6)
bL =
1
(naL 2)+MaL exp(abL )+nbLMbaL exp(bL)
  M
ba
L exp(bL)
(naL 1)+MaL exp(abL )+(nbL 1)MbaL exp(bL)
+ LqL
Lf
(B.7)
abL =
1
(naL 2)+MaL exp(abL )+nbLMbaL exp(bL)
  M
a
L exp(abL )
(naL 1)+nbLMbaL exp(bL)
: (B.8)
We next show that the rst (last) two equations have a unique solution in aL (
b
L) and 
ba
L
(abL ): Consider the rst two equations. Total di¤erentiation with respect to m
a
Lf yields in
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matrix form 24 1 + af jL(1 af jL)2 + af jL1 nbLbajjL1
af jL2 1 +
ba
jjL
(1 ba
jjL)
2 + n
b
L
ba
jjL2
35" daL=dmaLf
dbaL =dm
a
Lf
#
=  Lk
Lf
1
maLf
af jL
"
1
(1 a
f jL)
2 + 1
2
#
;
where
1 
ajjL
(1  ajjL)2
  
a
f jL
(1  af jL)2
and 2 
ajjL
(1  ajjL)2
  
ba
jjL
(1  bajjL)2
: (B.9)
By inversion, we obtain
daL
dmaLf
=  Lk
Lf
1
maLf
1
DaJ1
af jL
1 +
ba
jjL
(1 ba
jjL)
2

1
(1 a
f jL)
2 + 1

+ 1
(1 a
f jL)
2n
b
L
ba
jjL2

< 0
(B.10)
dbaL
dmaLf
=  Lk
Lf
1
maLf
1
DaJ1
af jL2: (B.11)
It is straightforward to show that the determinant DJ1 is unambiguously positive:
DJ1 =

1 +
a
f jL
(1 a
f jL)
2

1 +
ba
jjL
(1 ba
jjL)
2

+

1 +
a
f jL
(1 a
f jL)
2

nbL
ba
jjL2+

1 +
ba
jjL
(1 ba
jjL)
2

af jL1 > 0;
and, consequently, the solution (aL,
ba
L ) is unique.
Similarly, total di¤erentiation of bL and 
ab
L with respect to m
a
Lf yields
dabL
dmaLf
=  Lk
Lf
1
maLf
1
DJ2
abf jL
1 +
b
jjL
(1 b
jjL)
2

1
(1 ab
f jL)
2 + 3

+ 1
(1 ab
f jL)
2n
b
L
b
jjL4

< 0
(B.12)
dbL
dmaLf
=  Lk
Lf
1
maLf
1
DJ2
abf jL4 (B.13)
with
3 
abjjL
(1  abjjL)2
  
ab
f jL
(1  abf jL)2
and 4 
abjjL
(1  abjjL)2
  
b
jjL
(1  bjjL)2
(B.14)
and determinant DJ2:
DJ2 =

1 +
ab
f jL
(1 ab
f jL)
2

1 +
b
jjL
(1 b
jjL)
2

+

1 +
ab
f jL
(1 ab
f jL)
2

nbL
b
jjL4 +

1 +
b
jjL
(1 b
jjL)
2

abf jL3 > 0
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and uniqueness for (aL,
ba
L ) follows.
The rst order condition associated with the rst stage maximization problem is:
deaLf
dmaLf
=
NaEa[aL(y)]
af jL
(1  af jL)
Lf
qL
(
Lk
Lf
1
maLf
+
daL
dmaLf
  
ba
jjL
(1  af jL)
nbL
dbaL
dmaLf
)
+N bEb[bL(y)]
abf jL
(1  abf jL)
Lf
qL
(
Lk
Lf
1
maLf
+
dabL
dmaLf
  
b
jjL
(1  abf jL)
nbL
dbL
dmaLf
)
  FL = 0
Making use of (B.10), (B.11), (B.12) and (B.13), the rst order condition with respect to
the scope of production, maLf ; can be rewritten as
qL
Lk
maLFL = N
aEa [aL(y)]
af jL
(1  af jL)
1
DJ1

1 +
ba
jjL
(1 ba
jjL)
2

+
ba
jjL
(1 a
f jL)
nbL2

+N bEb

bL(y)
 abf jL
(1  abf jL)
1
DJ2

1 +
b
jjL
(1 b
jjL)
2

+
b
jjL
(1 ab
f jL)
nbL4

:
We now want to evaluate the rst order condition at the symmetric equilibrium, where
maLf = m
a
L; given the equilibrium prices. Using (B.9) and (B.14), we get
qL
Lk
maLFL = N
aEa[aL(y)]

~naL   1
(~naL)
2   ~naL + 1
 
1 + sa(maL;m
b
L)

(B.15)
+N bEb[bL(y)]
"
~nabL   1 
~nabL
2   ~nabL + 1
# 
1 + sab(maL;m
b
L)

where
sa(maL;m
b
L) =
af
(1 af)
waL2
1+
ba
j
(1 baf )
2+w
a
L2
(B.16)
= 1
~naL 1
waL
~naL
(~naL 1)
2
h
(~naL a)
2 a(~naL 1)
2
i

(~naL a)
2
+~naL
a

+waL
~na
L
(~naL 1)
2
h
(~naL a)
2 a(~naL 1)
2
i
sab(maL;m
b
L) =
abj
(1 abf )
wabL 4
1+
b
j
(1 bf)
2+w
ab
L 4
(B.17)
= 1
~nabL  1
wabL
~nabL
(~nabL  1)
2
h
(~nabL  ab)
2 ab(~nabL  1)
2
i

(~nabL  ab)
2
+~nabL 
ab

+wabL
~nab
L
(~nabL  1)
2
h
(~nabL  ab)
2 ab(~nabL  1)
2
i
and waL =
anbL
naL + 
anbL
and wabL =
abnbL
naL + 
abnbL
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B.1.3 Decision process of an L rm from country b
By symmetry, the price subgame for rm f of country b; yields
bjjL =
1
~nbL
, j = 1; ::; nb
bajjL =
1
~nbL
, j = 1; ::; nb
abjjL =
b
~nbL
, j = 1; ::; nb
with ~nbL = n
b
L + 
bnaL; 
b = MabL exp
 
abL

;
~nbaL = n
b
L + 
banaL; 
ba = MabL exp (
a
L ) :
The denitions for abL and 
a
L are not specied explicitly here. The associated rst order
condition at this symmetric equilibrium, gives
qL
Lk
mbLFL = N
bEb[bL(y)]
"
~nbL   1 
~nbL
2   ~nbL + 1
# 
1 + sb(maL;m
b
L)

(B.18)
+NaEa[aL(y)]
"
~nbaL   1 
~nbaL
2   ~nbaL + 1
# 
1 + sba(maL;m
b
L)

where
sb(maL;m
b
L) =
1
~nbL 1
wbL
~nbL
(~nbL 1)2
h
(~nbL b)
2 b(~nbL 1)
2
i
(~nbL 1)
2

(~nbL)
2 ~naLb+(b)
2

+wbL
~nbL
(~nbL 1)2
h
(~nbL b)
2 b(~nbL 1)
2
i
sba(maL;m
b
L) =
1
~nbaL  1
wbaL
~nbaL
(~nbaL  1)2
h
(~nbaL  ba)
2 ba(~nbaL  1)
2
i
(~nbaL  1)
2

(~nbaL )
2 ~nbaL ba+(ba)
2

+wbaL
~nbaL
(~nbaL  1)2
h
(~nbaL  ba)
2 ba(~nbaL  1)
2
i
with wbL =
bnaL
nbL + 
bnaL
and wbaL =
banaL
nbL + 
banaL
:
B.1.4 Symmetric equilibrium summary
In symmetric equilibrium, the prices are given by
Market a Market b
paHf =
Hf
qH
nH
nH 1 + cH p
ab
Hf =
Hf
qH
nH
nH 1 + cH + H
paLf =
Lf
qL
~naL
~naL 1 + cL p
b
Lf =
Lf
qL
~nbL
~nbL 1
+ cL
pbaLj =
Lf
qL
~naL
~naL a + cL + L p
ab
Lj =
Lf
qL
~nbL
~nbL b
+ cL + L
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and abL =  bL and aL =  baL ; so that aba = 1 and bab = 1: As ~naL = a~nbaL and
~nbL = 
b~nabL :
~naL
~naL a =
~nbaL
~nbaL  1
;
~nbL
~nbL b
=
~nabL
~nabL  1
:
We assume ~naL < ~n
ab
L and ~n
b
L < ~n
ba
L , indicative that the e¤ective number of competitors
in the presence of transportation cost is smaller in the home market than in the foreign
market and a < 1 < ab; b < 1 < ba:
B.1.5 Comparative Statics
To obtain the total di¤erential of equations (39), (40), and (41), we make use of the following
results
dbaL =  daL =  
LqL
Lf
"bL
dbL =  dabL =
LqL
Lf
"bL
(uses equations (B.5)(B.8)), where " denotes the (positive) elasticity of transport cost on
prices (through the L terms). For simplicity we assume them to be identical.
Evaluating Ea[aL(y)] at the symmetric equilibrium gives
Ea[aL(y)]
= Ea
"
(naL)
Lf (maL)
Lk L(y; ~n
a
L) +
 
Lv
a
Ln
b
L
Lf  mbLLk L(y; ~naL)
(naL)
Lf (maL)
Lk +
 
LvaLn
b
L
Lf  mbLLkL(y; ~naL) + (naH)Hf (maH)Hk H(y; naH)
#
 Ea[aaL (y)] + Ea[abL (y)];
where
L = exp
  LqL=Lf and vaL = exp ~naL(~naL 1)   ~naL(~naL a)
since
exp [(y   pH)qH ] = exp
h
(y   cH)qH   Hf nH(nH 1)
i
 H(y; naH)
exp [(y   paL)qL] = exp
h
(y   cL)qL   Lf ~n
a
L
(~naL 1)
i
 L(y; ~naL)
exp

(y   pbaL )qL

= exp

(y   cL   L)qL   Lf
~naL
~naL   a

 L(y; ~naL) exp

Lf

~naL
(~naL 1)  
~naL
(~naL a)

exp ( LqL) :
Similarly
Eb[bL(y)]
= Eb
"  
Lv
b
Ln
a
L
Lf (maL)Lk L(y; ~nbL)) +  nbLLf  mbLLk L(y; ~nbL) 
LvbLn
a
L
Lf (maL)Lk +  nbLLf  mbLLkL(y; ~nbL) + (HnaH)Hf (maH)Hk H(y; naH)
#
 Eb[baL (y)] + Eb[bbL (y)];
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where
H = exp
  HqH=Hf and vbL = exp ~nbL(~nbL 1)   ~nbL(~nbL b)
Let us dene aaHL = E
a [aaL (y)
a
H(y)] ; 
ab
HL = E
a

abL (y)
a
H(y)

with aaHL+
ab
HL = 
a
HL 
Ea [aL(y)
a
H(y)], and by symmetry 
ba
HL = E
b

baL (y)
b
H(y)

; bbHL = E
b

bbL (y)
b
H(y)

with
baHL + 
bb
HL = 
b
HL  Eb

bL(y)
b
H(y)

:
With L(y) concave in y (i.e., assuming L(y) > H(y) for all y as before); we expect
bHL=
b
L > 
a
HL=
a
L; as a denotes the rich country and b the poor country.
Total di¤erentiation of aL(y) and 
b
L(y) yields
baL = Lk 1  ~naL
(~naL   1)2
waL

aaHL
aL
+
~naL
a
(~naL   a)2
(1  waL)
abHL
aL

m^aL (B.19)
+Lk

~naL
(~naL   1)2
waL
aaHL
aL
+

1  ~n
a
L
a
(~naL   a)2
(1  waL)

abHL
aL

m^bL
 Hk
aHL
aL
m^aH +
aHL
aL
[qL   qH ] dya
+Lf

~naL
(~naL   1)2
waL"
aaHL
aL
+

1  ~n
a
L
a
(~naL   a)2
(1  waL) "

abHL
aL
 bL
 maLaLm^aL + mbLaLm^
b
L   maHaLm^aH + yaaLdya + LaLbL
bbL = Lk
"
~nbL 
~nbL   1
2wbLbbHLbL +
 
1  ~n
b
L
b 
~nbL   b
2  1  wbL
!
baHL
bL
#
m^aL (B.20)
+Lk
" 
1  ~n
b
L 
~nbL   1
2wbL
!
bbHL
bL
+
~nbL
b 
~nbL   b
2  1  wbL baHLbL
#
m^bL
 Hk
bHL
bL
m^aH +
bHL
bL
[qL   qH ] dyb   Hf
bHL
bL
^H
+Lf
"
~nbL 
~nbL   1
2wbL" bbHLbL +
 
1  ~n
b
L
b 
~nbL   b
2  1  wbL "
!
baHL
bL
# bL
 maLbLm^
a
L + mbLbLm^
b
L   maHbLm^
a
H + ybbLdy
b   HbL^H + LbLbL:
If waL = w
b
L = 0 (that is if there is no foreign competition in the home market), the total
di¤erential simplies to that in autarky.
The analysis below makes extensive use of the following notation: !aH  N
aaH
NaaH+N
bbH
;
which denes the share of high-quality goods that are bought by consumers from country
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a; and
!aaL =
NaaL
NaaL +N
bbL
ab
with ab =

~nabL  1
(~nabL )
2 ~nabL +1
 
1 + sab(maL;m
b
L)


~naL 1
(~naL)
2 ~naL+1
 
1 + sa(maL;m
b
L)
 (B.21)
!baL =
NaaL
ba
NaaL +N
bbL
ba
with ab =

~nbaL  1
(~nbaL )
2 ~nbaL +1
 
1 + sba(maL;m
b
L)


~nbL 1
(~nbL)
2 ~nbL+1
 
1 + sb(maL;m
b
L)
 (B.22)
which, respectively, dene the share of domestic and foreign marginal prots belonging to
rms from country a: !abL = 1 !aaL and !bbL = 1 !baL : It is reasonable to expect !aaL > !baL ;
in fact if N bbL is su¢ ciently big relative to N
aaL; we expect !
aa
L + !
ba
L < 1.
Total di¤erentiation of the short-run equilibrium conditions (39), (40), and (41), then
yields, respectively
m^aH = !
a
HbaH + (1  !aH)bbH =  !aH aLaH baL   (1  !aH) 
b
L
bH
bbL; (B.23)
m^aL = !
aa
L baL + !abL bbL + (haL   eaL) LkLf (m^aL   m^bL)  (haL   eaL) "bL; (B.24)
and
m^bL = !
bb
LbbL + !baL baL    hbL   ebL LkLf (m^aL   m^bL)   hbL   ebL " ^L; (B.25)
where
haL =
24!aaL waL(~naL   1) (~n
a
L)
2 (~naL   2)
(~naL)
2   ~naL + 1
 + !abL wabL ~nabL   1
 
~nabL
2
(~nabL   2)h 
~nabL
2   ~nabL + 1i
35 > 0
eaL =

!aaL
sa
(1 + sa)
"sa + !
ab
L
sab
(1 + sab)
"sab

hbL =
24!bbL wbL ~nbL   1
 
~nbL
2
(~nbL   2)h 
~nbL
2   ~nbL + 1i + !baL
wbaL 
~nbaL   1
  ~nbaL 2 (~nbaL   2)h 
~nbaL
2   ~nbaL + 1i
35 > 0
ebL =

!bbL
sb
(1 + sb)
"sb + !
ba
L
sba
(1 + sba)
"sba

:
Here "sa denotes the 
a elasticity of saL(m
a
L;m
b
L) and "sab the 
ab elasticity of sabL (m
a
L;m
b
L):
The denitions of "sb and "sba are analogous.
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Using (B.19) and (B.20) and recognizing ^aL =   
a
L
aH
^aH ; we then obtain in matrix form:264 e11 e12 e13e21 e22 e23
e31 e32 e33
375
264 m^
a
H
m^aL
m^bL
375
=
2664
 !aH 
a
L
aH
 !bH 
b
L
bH
!bH
bL
bH
 !aH 
a
L
aH
LaL   !bH
bL
bH
LbL
!aaL !
ab
L  !abL !aaL LaL + !abL LbL   (haL   eaL) "
!baL !
bb
L  !bbL !baL LaL + !bbL LbL  
 
hbL   ebL

"
3775
266664
yaaLdy
a
ybbLdy
b
HbL^HbL
377775 :
The elements of the Jacobian matrix are
e11 =
h
1 

!aHmaHaH + !
b
HmaHbH
i
 1  !aHH
e12 =  

!aHmaLaH + !
b
HmaLbH



!aH
aL
aH
maLaL + !
b
H
bL
bH
maLbL

e13 =  

!aHmbLaH + !
b
HmbLbH



!aH
aL
aH
mbLaL + !
b
H
bL
bH
mbLbL

e21 =
h
!aaL maHaL + !
ab
L maHbL
i
 !aLL
e22 =

1 

!aaL maLaL + !
ab
L maLbL

  (haL   eaL)
Lk
Lf

e23 =  

!aaL mbLaL + !
ab
L mbLbL

+ (haL   eaL)
Lk
Lf
e31 =

!bbL maHbL + !
ba
L maHaL

 !bLL
e32 =  

!bbL maLbL + !
ba
L maLaL

+
 
hbL   ebL
 Lk
Lf
e33 =

1 

!bbL mbLbL + !
ba
L mbLaL

   hbL   ebL LkLf

:
and !aHH ; !
a
LL; !
b
LL 2 (0; 1):
By inversion we obtain264 m^
a
H
m^aL
m^bL
375 = 1
DIS
264 (e22e33   e32e23)  (e12e33   e32e13) (e12e23   e22e13) (e21e33   e23e31) (e11e33   e31e13)  (e11e23   e21e13)
(e21e32   e22e31)  (e11e32   e31e12) (e11e22   e21e12)
375
2664
 !aH 
a
L
aH
 !bH 
b
L
bH
!bH
bL
bH
 !aH 
a
L
aH
LaL   !bH
bL
bH
LbL
!aaL !
ab
L  !abL !aaL LaL + !abL LbL   (haL   eaL) "
!baL !
bb
L  !bbL !baL LaL + !bbL LbL  
 
hbL   ebL

"
3775
266664
yaaLdy
a
ybbLdy
b
HbL^HbL
377775
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When !aLL = !
b
LL , the determinant is given by
DIS = (1  !aHH   !aLL)
1   !aaL   !baL  mbLbL   maLbL   haL   eaL + hbL   ebL LkLf

:
The rst term in the determinant is unambiguously positive. We assume that the di¤eren-
tial competition- and price e¤ect (haL eaL+hbL ebL) and the di¤erential impact of
 
maL;m
b
L

on bL (mbLbL   maLbL) are not too large to change the sign of the determinant ensuring the
determinant is positive.
In general, with !aLL 6= !bLL; the determinant is
DIS = (1  !aHH   !aLL)
0@ 1  !aaL  !baL!aaL haHLaL (mbLbL   mbLaL) + aHLaL   bHLbL  mbLaLi
 
h
!bLL
!aLL
(haL   eaL) +
 
hbL   ebL
i Lk
Lf
1A
+

1  !
b
LL
!aLL
0BBB@
mbLaL

!aH
aL
aH
!aLL + !
aa
L (1  !aHH)

+mbLbL

!bH
bL
bH
!aLL + !
ab
L (1  !aHH)

  (1  !aHH) (haL   eaL) LkLf
1CCCA :
We assume the determinant remains positive. With !aaL + !
ba
L < 1 and 
a
HL=
a
L < 
b
HL=
b
L;
we are guaranteed that 1   !bLL
!aLL
> 0; as before we assume that the competition (haL; h
b
L)
and price (eaL; e
b
L) e¤ects (in di¤erences) are not too strong.
Change in trade cost for high quality goods We make use of the following results
below:
(!abL !
b
LL   !bbL!aLL) =  (!aaL   !baL )
aHL
aL
(!aaL !
b
LL   !baL !aLL) = (!aaL   !baL )
bHL
bL
!aaL !
bb
L   !abL !baL = !aaL   !baL = !bbL   !abL ;
and we recall that an increase in ; is associated with a decrease in transportation cost ().
Associated with an increase in H ; we obtain:
m^aH
^H
=
HbL
DIS
8>>><>>>:
!bH
bL
bH
h
1  !aaL maLaL   !baL mbLaL
i
+ !aH
aL
aH
h
!abL maLaL + !
bb
L mbLaL
i
   hbL   ebL LkLf h!bH bLbH h1  !aaL maLaL + mbLaLi+ !aH aLaH!abL maLaL + mbLaLi
  (haL   eaL) LkLf
h
!bH
bL
bH
h
1  !baL

maLaL + mbLaL
i
+ !aH
aL
aH
!bbL

maLaL + mbLaL
i
9>>>=>>>;
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m^aL
^H
=  HbL
DIS
8>>><>>>:
!bH
bL
bH
!aLL + (1  !aHH)!abL + mbLaL
 
!aaL   !baL
 h
!bH
bHL
bH
+ !aH
aHL
aH
+ (1  !aHH)
i
   hbL   ebL LkLf h!aLL!bH bLbH + (1  !aHH)!abL i
  (haL   eaL) LkLf
h
!bLL!
b
H
bL
bH
+ (1  !aHH)!bbL
i
9>>>=>>>;
and
m^bL
^H
=  HbL
DIS
8>>><>>>:
!bH
bL
bH
!bLL + (1  !aHH)!bbL   maLaL
 
!aaL   !baL
 h
!bH
bHL
bH
+ !aH
aHL
aH
+ (1  !aHH)
i
   hbL   ebL LkLf h!aLL!bH bLbH + (1  !aHH)!abL i
  (haL   eaL) LkLf
h
!bLL!
b
H
bL
bH
+ (1  !aHH)!bbL
i
9>>>=>>>; :
Change in income An increase in income in country b; is easily obtained as by propor-
tionality:
m^aH
dyb
=  m^
a
H
^H
ybbL
HbL
m^aL
dyb
=  m^
a
L
^H
ybbL
HbL
m^bL
dyb
=  m^
b
L
^H
ybbL
HbL
An increase in income in country a; gives rise to comparable relations. Specically
m^aH
dya
=  yaaL
DIS
8>>><>>>:
!aH
aL
aH
h
1  !abL maLbL   !bbL mbLbL
i
+ !bH
bL
bH
h
!aaL maLbL + !
ba
L mbLbL
i
   hbL   ebL LkLf h!aH aLaH 1  !abL maLaL + mbLaL+ !bH bLbH!aaL maLaL + mbLaLi
  (haL   eaL) LkLf
h
!aH
aL
aH

1  !bbL

maLaL + mbLaL

+ !bH
bL
bH
!baL

maLaL + mbLaL
i
9>>>=>>>;
m^aL
dya
=
yaaL
DIS
8>>><>>>:
!aH
aL
aH
!aLL + (1  !aHH)!aaL + mbLaL
 
!aaL   !baL
 h
!bH
aHL
aH
+ !aH
bHL
bH
+ (1  !aHH)
i
   hbL   ebL LkLf h!aLL!aH aHLaH + (1  !aHH)!aaL aHLaL i
  (haL   eaL) LkLf
h
!bLL!
a
H
aHL
aH
+ (1  !aHH)!baL 
a
HL
aL
i
9>>>=>>>;
and
m^bL
dya
=
yaaL
DIS
8>>><>>>:
!aH
aL
aH
!bLL + (1  !aHH)!baL + maLbL
 
!aaL   !baL
 h
!bH
bL
bH
bHL
bL
+ !aH
aL
aH
aHL
aL
+ (1  !aHH)
i
   hbL   ebL LkLf h!aLL!aH aLaH + (1  !aHH)!aaL i
  (haL   eaL) LkLf
h
!bLL!
a
H
aL
aH
+ (1  !aHH)!baL
i
9>>>=>>>;
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Change in trade cost for low quality goods An increase in L :
m^aHbL =
"
LaH
yaaL
m^aH
dya
+
LbL
ybbL
m^aH
dyb
#
+
1
DIS
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
  (haL   eaL) "

!aHmaLaH + !
b
HmaLbH

   hbL   ebL " !aHmbLaH + !bHmbLbH
  (haL   eaL) "

bL
bH
!bH +
aL
aH
!aH

!bbL   
a
L
aH
!aH

maLaLmbLbL   maLbLmbLaL

   hbL   ebL "  bLbH!bH + aLaH!aH!aaL   aLaH!aHmaLaLmbLbL   maLbLmbLaL
+
h
(haL   eaL)
 
hbL   ebL

"
Lk
Lf
i 
aL
aH

mbLaH + m
a
L
a
H

+
bL
bH

mbLbH + maLbH

9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
m^aLbL =
"
LaH
yaaL
m^aL
dya
+
LbL
ybbL
m^aL
dyb
#
+
1
DIS
8>>><>>>:
  (haL   eaL) "

(1  !aHH)

1  !baL mbLaL   !bbL mbLbL

+ !bLL
h
!aHmbLaH + !
b
HmbLbH
i
   hbL   ebL " (1  !aHH)!aaL mbLaL + !abL mbLbL  !aLL h!aHmbLaH + !bHmbLbHi
+2

(haL   eaL)
 
hbL   ebL

"
 Lk
Lf
(1  !aHH)
9>>>=>>>;
m^bLbL =
"
LaH
yaaL
m^bL
dya
+
LbL
ybbL
m^bL
dyb
#
+
1
DIS
8>>><>>>:
  (haL   eaL) "

(1  !aHH)

!baL maLaL + !
bb
L maLbL

  !bLL
h
!aHmaLaH + !
b
HmaLbH
i
   hbL   ebL " (1  !aHH)1  !aaL maLaL   !abL maLbL+ !aLL h!aHmaLaH + !bHmaLbHi
+
h
2 (haL   eaL)
 
hbL   ebL

"
Lk
Lf
i
(1  !aHH)
9>>>=>>>;
B.2 Complete specialization
B.2.1 Decision process of H rms in a and L rms in b
Given complete specialization we can make use of the analysis of the decision process of
H rms in a in the incomplete specialization setting for both H rms in a and L rms in
b: The conditional probability for low quality goods in country a and b when countries are
completely specialized simplies to
aL = E
a

(LnL)
Lf (mL)
Lk L(y; nL)
[(HnH)
Hf (mH)HkH(y; nH)] + [(LnL)
Lf (mL)LkL(y; nL)]

(B.26)
bL = E
b

[(LnL)
Lf (mL)
LkL(y; nL)]
[(HnH)
Hf (mH)HkH(y; nH)] + [(LnL)
Lf (mL)LkL(y; nL)]

;(B.27)
where i = exp[  iqi=if ] (contrast with (42) and (43)).
62
B.2.2 Short-run analysis
We determine the optimal range of products per rm by total di¤erentiation of the rst
order conditions, which are
mLFL   Lk
qL

(nL   1)
(n2L   nL + 1)
2664 N
aEa

(LnL)
Lfm
Lk
L L(y)
[n
Hf
H m
Hk
H H(y)]+[(LnL)
Lfm
Lk
L L(y)]

+N bEb

[n
Lf
L m
Lk
L L(y)]
[(HnH)Hfm
Hk
H H(y)]+[n
Lf
L m
Lk
L L(y)]

3775 = 0
(B.28)
mHFH   Hk
qH

(nH   1)
(n2H   nH + 1)
2664 N
aEa

[n
Hf
H m
Hk
H H(y)]
[n
Hf
H m
Hk
H H(y)]+[(LnL)
Lfm
Lk
L L(y)]

+N bEb

[(HnH)Hfm
Hk
H H(y)]
[(HnH)Hfm
Hk
H H(y)]+[n
Lf
L m
Lk
L L(y)]

3775 = 0:
(B.29)
We make use of
baL = Lf 1 + nL(nL 1)2 aHLaL bnL   Hf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2
 aHL
aL
bnH + Lk aHLaL bmL   Hk 
a
HL
aL
bmH
+Lf
aHL
aL
bL + aHL
aL
[qL   qH ] dya
bbL = Lf 1 + nL(nL 1)2 bHLbL bnL   Hf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2
 bHL
bL
bnH + Lk bHLbL bmL   Hk 
b
HL
bL
bmH
 Hf
bHL
bL
bH + bHL
bL
[qL   qH ] dyb;
where as before ^L =   LqLLf ^L and ^H =  
HqH
Hf
^H : Recognizing that baH =   aLaHbaL andbbH =   bLbHbbL; the total di¤erential of the rst order conditions for the range of products
per rm for i = H;L; can then be written in matrix notation as" bmLbmH
#
=
1
DS
"
cH2  cL2
 cH1 cL1
#

"
cL3 cL4 cL5  cL6 cL7  cL8 cL9 cL10
cH3 cH4  cH5 cH6  cH7 cH8  cH9  cH10
#
2666666666666664
bNabN bbnLbnHbLbH
[qL   qH ] dya
[qL   qH ] dyb
3777777777777775
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with
cL1 = (1  !aLL)
cL2 =
Hk
Lk
!aLL
cL3 = !
a
L
cL4 = 1  !aL
cL5 =
h
!aLL
Lf
Lk
(1 + nL
(nL 1)2 ) 
n2L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
i
cL6 = !
a
LL
Hf
Lk

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

cL7 = Lf!
a
L
aHL
aL
cL8 = Hf (1  !aL)
b
HL
bL
cL9 = !
a
L
aHL
aL
cL10 = (1  !aL) 
b
HL
bL
cH1 =
Lk
Hk
!aHH
cH2 = (1  !aHH)
cH3 = !
a
H
cH4 = 1  !aH
cH5 = !
a
HH
Lf
Hk
(1 + nL
(nL 1)2 )
cH6 =
h
!aHH
Hf
Hk
(1 + nH
(nH 1)2 ) 
n2H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
i
cH7 = Lf!
a
H
aHL
aH
cH8 = Hf (1  !aH)
b
HL
bH
cH9 = !
a
H
aHL
aH
cH10 = (1  !aH)
b
HL
bH
;
where, as in the incomplete specialization setting,
!ai 
Naai
Naai +N
bbi
 1  !bi ;
and
0 < !aHH = !
a
H

Hk
aHL
aH

+ (1  !aH)

Hk
bHL
bH



!aHmaHaH + !
b
HmaHbH

< 1;
0 < !aLL = !
a
L

Lk
aHL
aL

+ (1  !aL)

Lk
bHL
bL

< 1:
The determinant DS; is positive. Specically, DS is given by
DS = [1  !aLL] [1  !aHH ]  !aLL!aHH
= 1  !aLL   !aHH
which exceeds 1  
h
!aL
aHL
aL
+ (1  !aL) 
b
HL
bL
i
 
h
!aH
aHL
aH
+ (1  !aH) 
b
HL
bH
i
since Lf and Hf
2 (0; 1) : The latter can be shown to be positive, as using their denitions, it is equivalent
to showing
NaaL +N
bbL   (NaaHL +N bbHL)
 
NaaH +N
bbH   (NaaHL +N bbHL)

  NaaHL +N bbHL NaaHL +N bbHL > 0:
This di¤erence can be decomposed in four parts, where
NaNa [aH
a
L   aHaHL   aLaHL] = NaNa [aHaL   aHL] > 0
N bN b

bL
b
H   bHbHL   bLbHL

= N bN b

bL
b
H   bHL

> 0
N bNa

bH
a
L   bHaHL   aLbHL

N bNa

aH
b
L   aHbHL   bLaHL

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The sum of the latter two terms is positive as well, as rearranging yields 
bH
a
L   bHaHL   aLbHL

+
 
aH
b
L   aHbHL   bLaHL

=
 
bH
a
L   bHLaL   bHLaH

+
 
aH
b
L   aHLbL   aHLbH

=
 
bH
a
L   bHL

+
 
aH
b
L   aHL

> bH
 
aL   bL

+ aH
 
bL   aL

=
 
aH   bH
  
bL   aL

=
 
bL   aL
2
> 0:
It follows that DS > 0:
Change in number of brands: The e¤ect of number of rms on the product range is
given by
bmLbnL = 1LkDS
h
(1 + nL
(nL 1)2 )Lf!
a
LL   n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
Lk(1  !aHH)
i
bmHbnL =   !
a
HH
HkDS
h
(1 + nL
(nL 1)2 )Lf  
n2L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
Lk
i
bmLbnH =   !
a
LL
LkDS
h
(1 + nH
(nH 1)2 )Hf  
n2H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
Hk
i
bmHbnH = 1HkDS
h
(1 + nH
(nH 1)2 )Hf!
a
HH   n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
Hk (1  !aLL)
i
:
Reduction in transportation costs: The e¤ect of lower trade cost (associated with an
increase in ) on product range is given by:
bmHbL =  LfDS !aH 
a
HL
aH
< 0
bmHbH = HfDS (1  !aH) 
b
HL
bH
> 0
bmLbL = LfDS !aL
a
HL
aL
> 0
bmLbH =  HfDS (1  !aL) 
b
HL
bL
< 0:
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B.2.3 Long-run analysis
Analogous to the long-run autarky comparative statics, we express baL and bbL in terms of
the relative changes in ni and transportation costs:
baL = aHLaL 1DS
h
Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

  Lk n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
i bnL (B.30)
 
a
HL
aL
1
DS
h
Hf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  Hk n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
i bnH
+Lf
aHL
aL
1
DS
h
DS + Lk!
a
L
aHL
aL
+ Hk!
a
H
aHL
aH
i bL
 Hf
aHL
aL
1
DS
h
Lk(1  !aL)
b
HL
bL
+ Hk(1  !aH)
b
HL
bH
i bH
bbL = bHLbL 1DS
h
Lf

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

  Lk n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
i bnL (B.31)
 
b
HL
bL
1
DS
h
Hf

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  Hk n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
i bnH
+Lf
bHL
bL
1
DS
h
Lk!
a
L
aHL
aL
+ Hk!
a
H
aHL
aH
i bL
 Hf
bHL
bL
1
DS
h
DS + Lk (1  !aL) 
b
HL
bL
+ Hk (1  !aH) 
b
HL
bH
i bH
Making use of (B.30) and (B.31), we obtain the total di¤erential of
qiKi
"
(ni   1) (n2i   ni + 1)
(if   ik) (ni   1)2 + ifni
#
= NaEa[ai (y; ni)] +N
bEb[bi(y; ni)]
for i = H;L: In matrix form we get" bnLbnH
#
=
1eDS
"
d2nH  d1nH
 d2nL d1nL
#"
d1L  d1H
 d2L d2H
#" bLbH
#
where
d1nL = 'LDS   !aLL
h
Lf
Lk

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

  n2L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
i
= 'LDS  
!aLL
!aHH
d2nL
d1nH = !
a
LL
h
Hf
Hk

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  n2H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
i
d2nL = !
a
HH
h
Lf
Lk

1 + nL
(nL 1)2

  n2L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)
i
d2nH = 'HDS   !aHH
h
Hf
Hk

1 + nH
(nH 1)2

  n2H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)
i
= 'HDS  
!aHH
!aLL
d1nH
eDS = 'LDS   !aLL!aHH d2nL

'HDS  
!aHH
!aLL
d1nH

  d2nLd1nH
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and
d1L = Lf!
a
L
aHL
aL
d1H = Hf (1  !aL)
bHL
bL
d2L = Lf!
a
H
aHL
aH
d2H = Hf (1  !aH)
bHL
bH
:
Analogous to the previous stability discussion,
eDS = DS('L'HDS   !aLL!aHH d2nL'H   !
a
HH
!aLL
d1nH'L) > 0:
Change in transportation cost The e¤ect of lower transportation costs on the number
of rms is given by
bnLbL = 1eDS'HDSLf!aL
a
HL
aLbnHbL =   1eDS'LDSLf!aH 
a
HL
aL
bnLbH =   1eDS'HDSd1HbnHbH = 1eDS'LDSd2H :
The e¤ect of lower trade costs on the product range yields:
bmLbL = LfeDS 
a
HL
aL
!aLDS'H

'L   n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)

bmHbL =  LfeDS 
a
HL
aH
!aHDS'L

'H   n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)

bmLbH =  HfeDS 
b
HL
bL
(1  !aL)DS'H

'L   n
2
L(nL 2)
(n2L nL+1)(nL 1)

bmHbH = HfeDS 
b
HL
bH
(1  !aH)DS'L

'H   n
2
H(nH 2)
(n2H nH+1)(nH 1)

:
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